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Fixing Congress 
Samuel A. Marcosson* 
The United States Congress is a broken, dysfunctional mess. I 
would ask us to count the ways, but there are too many to count (and 
more important, too many to deal with in one article).1 The aspects 
of congressional disrepair upon which I intend to focus here are two-
 
 *  Professor of Law, University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law. 
 1. Of necessity, the remaining issues that plague Congress are beyond the scope of one 
article. The biggest and most intractable is the problem of money, and the need of members of 
Congress to raise it in ever-increasing quantities. This insatiable need for cash begins from the 
start of one term and runs to the day the voters go to the polls in their next bid. Instead of 
spending their time legislating, senators and representatives must spend time at fundraisers, 
calling prospective donors, and doing everything they can to build a war chest to either ward off 
a dangerous challenger or to win reelection if a challenger emerges. See Ryan Grim & Sabrina 
Siddiqui, Call Time for Congress Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak Work Life, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/call-
time-congressional-fundraising_n_2427291.html. The constantly greater need for cash was 
triggered by the Supreme Court’s campaign finance decisions that struck down limits on the 
amount candidates could spend on their campaigns, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), 
the amount organizations (including for-profit companies) can spend on campaigns, see Citi-
zens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and the aggregate amount that a single donor could 
contribute in an election cycle, see McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). The explosion in 
campaign expenditures—in the form of both donations to candidates’ campaign coffers and in-
dependent expenditures—has made the ability to spend money on behalf of a candidate a key 
feature of how influence is exerted in Congress. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Crony Capitalism: 
How the Financial Industry Gets What It Wants, HUFFINGTON POST (May 11, 2009, 5:12 
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/11/crony-capitalsim-how-the_n_201602.html 
(noting that between 2000 and 2009 the financial sector contributed over $900 million to can-
didates for federal office and spent over $1.8 billion in lobbying Congress and the executive 
branch); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to 
the Too Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011); Mike Konczal, Rob Johnson on the 
One-Year Anniversary of Dodd-Frank, RORTYBOMB (July 21, 2011), https://rortybomb.word 
press.com/2011/07/21/rob-johnson-on-the-one-year-anniversary-of-dodd-frank/ (former chief 
economist for Senate Banking Committee arguing that Dodd-Frank, the response to the finan-
cial collapse of 2008-09, was already a “weak bill” whose implementation was being “tied in 
knots” by the influence of Wall Street). One other area of legislative disrepair is also worth a 
brief mention to illustrate how poorly Congress functions: Congress has not followed its own 
budget and appropriations process in a generation. See STEVE WOMACK, HOUSE BUDGET 
COMMITTEE, REFORMING THE BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS, (Feb. 18, 2018), 
https://budget.house.gov/budget-digest/reforming-budget-appropriations-process/ (“There is 
near universal agreement that the congressional budget process is broken and badly in need of 
reform. Perhaps the most visible sign of failure is that Congress has not followed regular order 
regarding the congressional budget and appropriations process since fiscal year 1995, the last 
time Congress passed a budget conference agreement followed by all of the separate appropria-
tions bills before the beginning of the fiscal year.”). 
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fold: the inability of the House of Representatives to function be-
cause it has become an institutionalized reflection of America’s polar-
ized politics, and the inability of the Senate to function because of its 
archaic rules that preclude, or at least greatly impede, action. It is lit-
tle wonder that polling results reflect both a deep cynicism among 
the American people about our politics, and an even deeper loathing 
for Congress as an institution.2 
I come not to bury Congress, but neither to praise it. Instead, I 
come to fix it. Or at least I come with proposals to accomplish that 
feat. Since these ideas require constitutional change, I have no illu-
sions that actually putting them into practice will be easy. It may not 
even be possible; this is the inevitable Catch-22 of trying to fix a po-
litical system that is as broken as ours. Any fix requires some opera-
tion of the system (here, utilizing the constitutional amendment pro-
cess which has always gone through Congress first), but if the system 
is broken, it is unlikely to operate sufficiently to implement the fix. 
Nevertheless, there is value in going beyond just exploring Con-
gress’ deep systemic problems by also proposing concrete solutions to 
deal with them, even if it is difficult to imagine the solutions actually 
being enacted. The clearest picture of the depth of Congress’ prob-
lems—and what they mean for our ability to govern ourselves—
emerges when we are forced to consider what it would take to solve 
them. To put it another way, our understanding of the crisis we face 
becomes all the more acute when we add to the picture a discussion 
of how difficult it will be to find and implement solutions. 
Thus, in Part I of this article, I discuss the extent to which the 
House of Representatives is beset by polarization and reduced to par-
tisan gridlock, deeply compromising the effectiveness of democratic 
decision-making. It will be evident from my discussion of a plan to 
address such polarization that our options to deal with the problem 
are severely limited. Then in Part II, I propose a constitutional solu-
tion to the quite different problem that causes gridlock in the Senate: 
the Senate’s own rules that slow consideration of legislation to           
a standstill. Again, I will discuss a proposal that I believe would solve 
the problem, but which would be almost impossible to enact,         
thus showing the difficulty of finding an effective solution to                
 
 2. See Ryan Struyk, Even Republicans Don’t Like Congress Anymore, CNN (Aug. 3, 
2017, 5:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/politics/republicans-congress-approval-
drops/index.html (reporting on Quinnipiac poll showing that approval of Congress had sunk to 
a “new low[]” of 10% in August 2017). 
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congressional dysfunction. Perhaps we will take the necessary steps to 
rescue Congress from its long-term decline only when we realize 
both that a congressional breakdown causes a crisis for democracy,3 
and that the solutions are vexing at best and unattainable at worst. 
I. IT WON’T MEAN A THING ‘TIL WE BRING BACK THAT 
SWING:4 COMPETITIVE DISTRICTS MAKE A BETTER 
CONGRESS=
The problem of districting is, of course, specific to the House of 
Representatives, since both Senators from each state are selected 
statewide.5 In this modern political era, the way most states conduct 
districting has contributed mightily to the partisan polarization we 
see in the House.6 Too many members of the House have become 
beholden only to a narrow slice of the electorate, producing a com-
plete unwillingness (indeed, verging on an inability) to compromise 
 
 3. It is fair to say that the Framers considered Congress the most powerful and im-
portant branch under the Constitution they created. Thus, having that branch deteriorate into 
ineffectiveness is nothing less than a crisis for our governing framework. No simple description 
of the role the Framers intended Congress to play is possible. In one respect, the Congress cre-
ated by the Constitution was less powerful than its predecessor under the Articles of Confed-
eration, since it would have to share power with (and have some of its power checked by) the 
other branches. But since the national government as a whole became substantially more pow-
erful, Congress’ power to make law within that system became enormously important—
especially combined with the President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws Congress enacted.  
 4. With apologies to Duke Ellington. See DUKE ELLINGTON, IT DON’T MEAN A 
THING (IF IT AIN’T GOT THAT SWING) (Brunswick Records 1932); It Don’t Mean A Thing 
(If It Ain’t Got That Swing, LEARN JAZZ STANDARDS https://www.learnjazzstandards.com/jazz 
-standards/it-dont-mean-a-thing-if-it-aint-got-that-swing/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (describ-
ing the song as a “classic piece” and “sort of [a] theme song for the [jazz] genre itself.”). 
 5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of 
two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator 
shall have one Vote.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each 
Senator shall have one vote.”). 
 6. Some states have gone to a form of non-partisan or bipartisan redistricting. See Ariz. 
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 2662 (2015) (rejecting 
state legislature’s challenge to amendment enacted by Arizona voters to state constitution to 
provide that redistricting of congressional and state legislative districts be handled by a non-
partisan commission). These approaches have been found to reduce the frequency of gerry-
mandered districts with polarized electorates. Id. (citing Peter Miller & Bernard Grofman, Re-
districting Commissions in the Western United States, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 637, 661, 663–
64, 666 (2013)); see also Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 
121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1808 (2012) (arguing that independent commissions “have not eliminated 
the inevitable partisan suspicions associated with political line-drawing,” but they have “suc-
ceeded to a great degree” in “limiting the conflict of interest implicit in legislative control over 
redistricting”). 
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across ideological and partisan lines. The result is gridlock instead of 
a functional legislature. 
The district lines in too many states are drawn primarily for the 
sake of partisan advantage to lock in or produce gains for the party 
that happens to hold power at the time redistricting rolls around.7 
This is possible because there is more than one way to divide up the 
same population into districts, and each way can have very different 
partisan ramifications.8 One technique available to the in-power party 
is to “pack” voters it knows are likely to support the other side into as 
few districts as possible—sacrificing those districts for the sake of 
their own gains elsewhere. The result is that the packed districts will 
be overwhelmingly partisan.9 The other typical method is to “crack” 
groups of voters who typically support the out-of-power party into 
separate districts where they might be 40% of the voters—not 
enough to win, but only enough to be frustrated every two years as a 
representative with very different views wins.10 The two methods, 
packing and cracking, are usually used in combination across a par-
ticular state in a particular redistricting cycle. Whether packing or 
cracking is used, the districts that result are one-sided as a matter of 
 
 7. See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD 
CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION 36 (2014) (urging an amendment to give federal courts au-
thority to strike down partisan gerrymanders, which Justice Stevens describes as those in which 
“a political party in control of a state government” draws district lines to “benefit[] that party by 
increasing the number of elections that its candidates will win,” with resulting districts “with 
bizarre shapes that prompt observers to question the motives of their architects.”). My focus 
here is not on the partisan advantage gained by the districting process, but on the impact it has 
on ideological and partisan polarization in Congress. 
 8. See Christopher Ingraham, This Is the Best Explanation of Gerrymandering You 
Will Ever See, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk 
/wp/2015/03/01/this-is-the-best-explanation-of-gerrymandering-you-will-ever-
see/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.044f10d905db (illustrating several redistricting options in a 
state with a state divided 60/40 between “blue” and “red,” pursuant to which the “blue” party 
could get a proportionate, 60% share of the seats, the blues could get all seats, or the “reds” 
could get 60%). 
 9. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1935–36 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing “packing” and “cracking” as the two methods of gerrymandering); Nate Cohn & 
Quoctrung Bui, How the New Math of Gerrymandering Works, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/03/upshot/how-the-new-math-of-
gerrymandering-works-supreme-court.html (“With packing, one party’s votes are concentrated 
into a district, resulting in wasted votes in lopsided victories.”). 
 10. See Roger Parloff, Packing and Cracking: The Supreme Court Takes up Partisan 
Gerrymandering, YAHOO NEWS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.yahoo.com/news/packing-
cracking-supreme-court-takes-partisan-gerrymandering-090050994.html?_tsrc=jtc_news_index 
(“Cracking means dispersing the rest of the opposing party’s voters into the remaining districts, 
where they are expected to be a permanent minority.”). 
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ideology and partisanship.11 This result means two things. First, the 
person who wins the seat is apt to contribute to polarization in 
Washington, because the candidate who emerges from the primary is 
likely to be the one who most strongly appeals to the party’s base,12 
by running the hardest to the left or right in the campaign. The per-
son who emerges is apt to be a strong partisan, rather than a moder-
ating force. And second, even if the person who wins the district is 
open to reaching out to seek compromise solutions, the political real-
ity is that doing so will open him or her up to a primary challenge 
two years later—and the primary is almost certain to be the only real 
threat in highly partisan districts.13 In short, these districts produce 
members of the House who are likely to be the strongest partisan 
warriors, and even when they are not, they will be subject to powerful 
political incentives to make them behave as if they are.14 
During the spring and summer of 2013, stories about attempts to 
pass comprehensive immigration reform illustrate the problem we 
have created for ourselves. As the Senate was moving towards passage 
of a bill15—a rare example of bipartisan consensus in that chamber 
 
 11. See Fred Drews, A Primer on Gerrymandering and Political Polarization, 
BROOKINGS INST. (July 6, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/07/06 
/a-primer-on-gerrymandering-and-political-polarization/ (“Congressional districts . . . are 
drawn in ways that make nearly all of them safe for one or another of the major political parties. 
Considered in tandem with low-turnout primaries, gerrymandering further diminishes the in-
fluence of moderates.”) (quoting William A. Galson & Elaine Kamarck, Make U.S. Politics 
Safe for Moderates, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/ 
make-u-s-politics-safe-for-moderates/). 
 12. STEVENS, supra note 7, at 37 (“Whether liberal or conservative, candidates can be 
expected to adopt more extreme positions when competing within a single party than when 
competing with a member of the opposite party. I firmly believe that gerrymandering has made 
our elected officials more doctrinaire and less willing to compromise with members of the op-
posite party.”). 
 13. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1940 (citing amicus brief filed by bipartisan group of current 
and former state legislators, which discussed “a ‘cascade of negative results’ from excessive par-
tisan gerrymandering: indifference to swing voters and their views; extreme political positioning 
designed to placate the party’s base and fend off primary challenges; the devaluing of negotia-
tion and compromise; and the impossibility of reaching pragmatic, bipartisan solutions to the 
nation’s problems”) (citing Brief for Bipartisan Group of 65 Current and Former State Legisla-
tors as Amici Curiae at 6, 25, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161)). 
 14. Parloff, supra note 10 (“[T]he caustic hyperpartisanship that characterizes national 
politics is at least in part a result of gerrymandering, which creates a plethora of safe seats for 
incumbents of both parties. Those representatives have disincentives to work across the aisle, 
lest the more extreme factions of their own party field a candidate to challenge them in the 
primaries—increasingly the only remaining contested elections.”). 
 15. See Elise Foley, Senate Immigration Reform Bill Passes With Strong Majority, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2013, 4:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/27/ 
senate-immigration-reform-bill_n_3511664.html (detailing passage of bill by vote of 68-32, 
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sufficient to overcome the typical resort to the partisan filibuster16—
reports showed why the legislation would face such a difficult time in 
the House, despite its strong bipartisan pedigree in the Senate. 
Speaker of the House John Boehner announced that he would not al-
low the Senate bill to even come to the floor for a vote unless it had 
the support of a majority of the House Republican caucus,17 but he 
also demanded the support of a majority of the House Democratic 
caucus.18 The problem with all of this is that requiring intra-party 
majorities means reaching further out from the center, to the more 
conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats—an ultimately self-
defeating and contradictory exercise, since the very provisions that 
would appeal to the former group would be poison pills to the latter. 
So why is it virtually impossible to craft a bill in the House on a 
controversial issue that could command the support of a majority of 
both party caucuses, so much so that the Speaker knew that imposing 
such a requirement would ensure the death of the immigration bill? 
Because the House itself has become so ideologically polarized along 
party lines; there are virtually no left-leaning Republicans, and almost 
as few conservative Democrats. The polarization has been accompa-
nied by moves to the extremes, as the baseline for what it means to be 
considered a conservative Republican has moved further to the right, 
and the same is true on the other wing for liberal Democrats. This    
is the recipe for a perfectly polarized legislature: no ideological over-
lap between the parties, combined with greater extremes defining  
each party. 
 
with bipartisan majority including fourteen Republican votes). 
 16. Id. (discussing features of the bill that included Democratic priorities such as a path 
to citizenship for undocumented immigrants already in the United States, and Republican pri-
orities such as “huge increases in border security, bolstered by an amendment from [GOP Sen-
ators] Corker and Hoeven that helped bring on board unsure Democrats and Republicans,” 
provisions which ultimately garnered enough support to easily cross the sixty-vote threshold to 
ensure that a filibuster could not succeed). 
 17. See Brett LoGiurato, If Boehner Isn’t Bluffing, He Probably Just Killed Immigration 
Reform, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/boehner-immigration-
reform-hastert-rule-conference-committee-2013-6 (quoting the Speaker that, “The House is 
not going to take up and vote on whatever the Senate passes. We’re going to do our own bill, 
through regular order, and it’ll be legislation that reflects the will of our majority and the will of 
the American people. For any legislation—including a conference report—to pass the House, 
it’s going to have to be a bill that has the support of a majority of our members.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 18. See Russell Berman, Boehner: Immigration Bill Will Require Majority of Both Par-
ties in the House, HILL (June 27, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/308217 
-boehner-immigration-bill-needs-majority-in-both-parties (“The Speaker later emphasized 
that immigration reform would need a majority of both Democrats and Republicans.”). 
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In this section I first establish the extreme ideological and parti-
san polarization that exists in the House and show the connection  
between that polarization and partisan gerrymandering. The           
relationship is not neat and clean, and the causation runs both ways. 
In other words, polarization has produced the conditions that result 
in gerrymandering, and those gerrymandered districts have then,     
in turn, added substantially to the partisan polarization in Congress 
by sending to Washington ever-more-extreme members of the 
House. In the second section I demonstrate that, while gerrymander-
ing is not the sole cause of our polarized politics, ending partisan   
districting (while not a panacea) will reduce the polarization we  
have seen. 
A.  Our Polarized House of Representatives and Its Complex 
Relationship to Partisan Redistricting 
If there is anything that pundits and political scientists agree on, 
it is that ideological polarization in Congress—and the House of 
Representatives most of all—has grown exponentially in the last sev-
eral decades.19 The partisan divide has become far clearer, and the 
members of each party have gone further in their chosen ideological 
directions (and thus further from each other). The lack of overlap be-
tween the parties, and their distance from each other, means that the 
battle lines have been hardening for decades. 
The Poole-Rosenthal Polarization Index measures the distance 
between Republicans and Democrats in Congress and how far each 
party is from the center. It can be utilized to assess whether the rela-
tionship between the parties has changed over time. “The Poole-
Rosenthal scale, based on members’ voting records, runs from -1 
(most liberal) to +1 (most conservative).”20 The scale shows a remark-
 
 19. Drew Desilver, The Polarized Congress of Today Has Its Roots in the 1970s, PEW 
RES. CTR., (June 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/polarized-
politics-in-congress-began-in-the-1970s-and-has-been-getting-worse-ever-since/ (arguing that 
“Democrats and Republicans [are] more ideologically separated than ever before”) [hereinafter 
Desilver, The Polarized Congress of Today]. Desilver describes the research of political scien-
tists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, which has shown a consistent trend since there was 
substantial ideological overlap between the parties in the 1970s, towards very little overlap in 
the 1990s, and none at all in the 112th Congress in 2011-2012. 
 20. Drew Desilver, Partisan Polarization, in Congress and Among Public, Is Greater 
Than Ever, PEW RES. CTR. (July 17, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/ 
17/partisan-polarization-in-congress-and-among-public-is-greater-than-ever/ [hereinafter De-
silver, Partisan Polarization]. 
MARCOSSON, FOR PUBLICIATION, 4.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  5:28 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 33 
234 
able trend. Over six decades, from the 1920s to the 1970s, and per-
haps into the 1980s, the parties had a relatively steady ideological re-
lationship in the House. The GOP hovered steadily between .2 and 
.4—generally moderately conservative—while Democrats stayed for 
the most part between -.2 and -.3—generally about as liberal as the 
Republicans were conservative.21 There was, it is fair to say, stability 
in the relationship between the parties and in the ideological make-
up of the House. 
The strong contingent of ideological moderates in both parties 
up until and through the 1980s was a big reason why the relationship 
between the parties remained so steady for so long. During some pe-
riods, principally from the 1920s to the mid-1950s, moderates made 
up a bigger percentage of the Democratic caucus, at times approach-
ing 80% of the Democrats in the House.22 In the 1950s, the share of 
moderates in the GOP House caucus surpassed that of the Demo-
crats and went over 50%—and even over 60% in the 1970s.23 For this 
entire period, both parties had a robust moderate membership; from 
the mid-1930s to the 1980s moderates constituted a minimum of 
30% (usually much higher) of both parties’ caucuses. This meant, in 
turn, that there was also considerable overlap between their ideologi-
cal positions and the voting records of their members. 
This reality—relative stability in the ideological positions of the 
parties and the presence of a significant number of moderates in each 
party who shared at least a reasonably high number of positions      
on issues—created opportunities for coalitions and compromise 
throughout most of the 20th century.24 While there were clear dis-
tinctions between the parties, there were also blurred lines, such as 
the division within the Democratic Party over civil rights legisla-
 
 21. See Keith Poole, Graphic Picture of a Polarized Congress, 41 UGARESEARCH 1, 
32–33 (2012), https://issuu.com/ugaresearch/docs/ugaresearch_sp12?e=1854225/2617568 
(graph entitled “House 1879-2011 Party Means on Liberal-Conservative Dimension”). 
 22. Id. (graph entitled “House 1879-2012 Percentage of Moderates (-0.25 to 0.25) in the 
Parties on Liberal-Conservative Dimension”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. It is important to note that while this was the norm for most of the 20th century, it 
has not always been true. We have experienced severe periods of ideological polarization be-
fore, and not all the explanations for the ideological overlap between the parties from the mid-
dle of the 20th century until the 1980s are necessarily positive. See Cynthia R. Farina, Congres-
sional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1702–
03 (2015) (noting the argument of some scholars that “significant levels of congressional polari-
zation are the norm in U.S. politics,” and that “[m]id-twentieth-century lows are the anomaly, a 
period when partisan conflict was suppressed by politically expedient accommodation of South-
ern racial repression.”). 
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tion.25 Republicans provided substantial support for passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, including 138 essential votes in the House, 
and the critical votes necessary to overcome a largely Democratic 
southern filibuster in the Senate.26 
But starting in the 1970s, and then accelerating quickly thereaf-
ter, this pattern unraveled. Republican moderates vanished; many 
congressional Republicans had been from the Northeast, and the 
GOP’s fortunes waned sharply in that part of the country.27 The 
House GOP caucus came to be dominated by conservatives from the 
South and West. Democratic moderates also disappeared; most of 
that breed had been from the South, and Democrats became vanish-
ingly scarce in the South,28 other than African-Americans from ma-
jority-minority districts who continued to be elected, and who were 
among the most liberal in the House.29 In just a few short years, the 
overlap between the parties that had been created by each side’s 
moderates disappeared, and the Poole-Rosenthal scores of each party 
went sharply in opposite directions. Polarization had come to the 
House.30 The trend seemed to reach its apex in the 111th Congress 
 
 25. See, e.g., Kathy Kattenberg, Republican House Member Misrepresents History on 
Civil Rights Legislation, MODERATE VOICE (Nov. 20, 2009), http://themoderatevoice.com/ 
53521/republican-house-member-misrepresents-history-on-civil-rights-legislation/(noting sta-
tistics showing that Democrats in the House split over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with 
Northern Democrats overwhelmingly supporting it, 145-9, but Southern Democrats voting 87-
7 against it—a tally much more like Southern Republicans, who voted 10-0 against the Act). 
 26. H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21 
CONST. COMMENTARY 641, 661 (2004). 
 27. See Desilver, The Polarized Congress of Today, supra note 20 (noting the “the dis-
appearance of moderate-to-liberal Republicans (mainly in the Northeast),” as evidenced by the 
fact that the “combined House delegation of the six New England states . . . went from 15 
Democrats and 10 Republicans in 1973-74 to 20 Democrats and two Republicans in 2011-12.”). 
 28. Id. (remarking on the disappearance of “conservative Democrats (primarily in the 
South)”).  
 29. Remarkably, there was only one Democrat in the 113th Congress from Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina and Georgia—a reasonably good working definition of 
the “Deep South”—who is not an African-American: Representative John Barrow of Georgia’s 
12th District. See Moni Basu, Last White House Democrat in the Deep South Fights for Polit-
ical Survival, CNN (Nov. 2, 2012), http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/02/last-white-
house-democrat-in-the-deep-south-fights-for-political-survival/. Barrow fought off a tough 
challenge in 2012 (made more difficult by partisan districting that altered the district he had 
represented since 2005 to make it even more amenable to a Republican candidate). Id.; see also 
Daniel Malloy, Re-elected Barrow Hopes Middle Is Revived in Congress, ATLANTA J.-CONST. 
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/national-govt-politics/re-elected-barrow-
hopes-middle-is-revived-in-congr/nSzhr/. 
 30. See Keith T. Poole, The Decline and Rise of Party Polarization in Congress During 
the Twentieth Century, EXTENSIONS 4-6 (2005), https://legacy.voteview.com/pdf/Carl_Albert 
_Extensions_essay_2005.pdf (discussing the disappearance of moderates in the House in the 
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(from 2009-2011), when “for the first time in modern history, in both 
the House and the Senate, the most conservative Democrat [was] 
slightly more liberal than the most liberal Republican. This is anoth-
er way of saying that the degree of overlap between the parties         
in Congress [was] zero.”31 One might have thought that crossing     
the “no ideological overlap” barrier would represent the high-water 
mark in partisan polarization. But amazingly enough, the unprece-
dented divide in the 111th Congress became even more pronounced 
in the 113th.32 
No one would claim that redistricting is the principal cause of the 
polarization that has consumed Capitol Hill. As noted, similar polari-
zation occurred in the Senate,33 which knows no districts. If partisan 
districting was the biggest part of the explanation for polarization, we 
would have seen it occur either exclusively, or at least more emphati-
cally, in the House. 
Instead, polarization in the House (and Senate) is less the product 
of systemic manipulation than it is a reflection of the wider polariza-
tion and stridency among Americans that characterizes our modern 
politics,34 and the rise of divisive (or “wedge”35) issues that have in-
creasingly fractured our politics. The issues that became so polarizing 
 
thirty years between the 93rd and 108th Congress, and the fact that the trend towards polariza-
tion in the House showed no signs of moderating as of 2004). 
 31. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: 
HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF 
EXTREMISM 45 (2012) (citing Ronald Brownstein, The Four Quadrants of Congress, 
NATIONAL JOURNAL (Feb. 5, 2010, 7:00 PM), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/553801/four 
-quadrants-congress) (emphasis added) [hereinafter MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT 
LOOKS]. 
 32. See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW (Mar. 21, 2015), 
https://legacy.voteview.com/political_polarization_2014.htm (presenting graphs showing the 
ideological “difference between the Republican and Democratic Party . . .  from the end of Re-
construction through the first session (2013) of the 113th Congress,” and illustrating that “po-
larization is now at a post-Reconstruction high in the House and Senate.”). 
 33. See Poole, supra note 30, at 4. 
 34. See Desilver, Partisan Polarization, supra note 21 (discussing Pew Research Center 
survey data showing sharp increase in percentages of Republicans who self-identify as “con-
servative,” Democrats who self-identify as “liberal,” and that the gap between Democrats and 
Republicans in their opinions on a range of issues in 2013 is double what it averaged between 
1987-2002). 
 35. See Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritar-
ianism, Multidisciplinary, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as 
Cultural Warriors, 75 DEN. U. L. REV. 1409, 1427, n.73 (1998) (defining “wedge issues” as 
those that tend to “aggravate social division between ingroups and outgroup” and which “pivot 
for the most part on sociolegal identities and interests derived from sexual orientation, 
race/ethnicity/nationality, socioeconomic class and sex/gender.”). 
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began with civil rights in the 1960s, which first fractured the Demo-
cratic Party and its hold on the South.36 Once the Democratic Party 
split, and lost much of its more conservative southern wing, a partisan 
realignment followed that contributed mightily to ending the overlap 
between the parties.37 Other wedge issues, such as those surrounding 
sexual politics (abortion, gay rights), the fight over the Vietnam War, 
guns, and crime, added to the sense of polarization and division. 
The increased polarization we have experienced in the last several 
decades is undeniable.38 Finding precise explanations and assigning 
each one an exact share of the blame is a more difficult task, and 
probably an ultimately futile one, especially since there are simply too 
many contributing causes to home in on any one of them as the cul-
prit. Once the parties re-aligned into completely separate ideological 
camps with far less overlap between the most conservative Democrats 
and the most liberal Republicans it should probably have been rea-
sonable to expect that the competition between them would sharpen 
along ideological lines, and the resulting attacks would intensify and 
increase antagonism in our political relationships. Beyond that, a so-
ciety that has undergone rapid economic transformation, including 
the dislocation caused by the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs39 
and the transition to a service economy, is bound to experience polit-
ical fallout, including intense politicization on issues that become tied 
 
 36. MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 31, at 47–48 (discussing 
the passage of historic civil rights legislation in the 1960s, the opposition to those laws by 
southern Democrats, and the eventual splintering of the south away from the Democratic Party 
in the 1970s and thereafter). 
 37. Thomas Mann, Polarizing the House of Representatives: How Much Does Gerry-
mandering Matter?, in PIETRO S. NIVOLA & DAVID W. BRADY, RED AND BLUE NATION?: 
CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS 263-64 (2006) (pointing 
to the breakdown of the Democratic Party’s New Deal North/South coalition in the 1960s over 
issues of race, the Vietnam War, and others as a critical turning point in the move towards par-
tisan polarization); David W. Brady & Hahrie C. Han, Polarization Then and Now: A Histori-
cal Perspective, in NIVOLA & BRADY, supra note 38, at 143 (“The transformation of the politi-
cal South was one of the most striking changes in twentieth-century politics, and it undoubtedly 
played a significant role in redefining – and thus repolarizing – the parties at the national lev-
el.”). 
 38. See James E. Campbell, Polarization Runs Deep, Even By Yesterday’s Standards, in 
NIVOLA & BRADY, supra note 38, at 157–61 (setting forth statistical evidence of a “shrinking 
political middle” between 1972 and 2004, with a significant decline in moderates and a corre-
sponding rise in the percentage of Americans describing themselves as liberal or conservative). 
 39. See Danielle Kurtzleben, Report: America Lost 2.7 Million Jobs to China in 10 
Years, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/ 
2012/08/24/report-america-lost-27-million-jobs-to-china-in-10-years (noting that just between 
2001 and 2012, the U.S. economy shed 5.1 million manufacturing jobs). 
MARCOSSON, FOR PUBLICIATION, 4.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  5:28 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 33 
238 
(rightly or wrongly, fairly or unfairly in the particulars) to jobs and 
economic insecurity, such as trade40 and affirmative action.41 
Of course, much has been made of the impact of the growth of 
media outlets that target particular niche audiences on the left or 
right as a cause of polarization. Cable news stations like FOX News 
and MSNBC cannot really be an initial cause of polarization, since 
polarization was already well under way before either began opera-
tions.42 After all, there must already be a polarized audience out there 
for cable stations and internet sites to be targeting. But the existing 
trend has been reinforced by these outlets, as they cater to the pre-
conceived beliefs of each side of the political spectrum.43 Still, no 
matter how incendiary their rhetoric and approach to political dis-
course, their impact in adding to polarization can easily be overstat-
 
 40. See Sucharita Ghosh, The Causal Relationship Between International Trade and 
Employment in the Manufacturing Sector of the United States, 14 INT’L TRADE J. 399 (2010) 
(study finding that international trade resulted in loss of over 5% of U.S. manufacturing jobs 
between 1978 and 1990); Louis Uchitelle, Here Come the Populists, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/weekinreview/26uchitelle.html (describing resur-
gence of populist arguments for trade restrictions among Democratic constituencies, against 
both the policies of the Bush administration and the views of some of the leading officials of the 
Clinton administration because of the consequences of income inequality). 
 41. A classic case of economic insecurity being used in a deeply polarizing way on the 
political issue of affirmative action was the 1990 North Carolina Senate race between incum-
bent Republican Jesse Helms and former Charlotte Mayor Harvey Gantt, in which the Helms 
campaign ran an ad late in the race attacking Gantt’s support for affirmative action as support 
for “Ted Kennedy’s racial quota law,” by showing a pair of white hands holding (and then 
crumpling up) a job rejection letter, with the voiceover saying that the person “needed that job 
and [was] the best qualified; but they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota.” See 
SnakesOnaBlog, Jesse Helms “Hands” Ad, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=KIyewCdXMzk. Helms, who had been trailing in the race, ended up winning. 
 42. FOX News launched in 1996. See Lawrie Mifflin, At the New Fox News Channel, 
the Buzzword Is Fairness, Separating News from Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 1996), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/07/business/at-the-new-fox-news-channel-the-buzzword-
is-fairness-separating-news-from-bias.html (discussing launch of Fox News and the views of 
founder Rupert Murdoch regarding the need to be “fair and balanced” by separating news cov-
erage and opinion programming). MSNBC began targeting a progressive audience a decade 
later. See Kelsey Sutton, How Trump Derailed MSNBC’s Centrist Makeover, MIC (July 28, 
2017), https://mic.com/articles/182982/how-trump-derailed-msnbcs-centrist-makeover#.3 
UPf3F7Fw (noting that MSNBC found “success as a progressive voice during the George W. 
Bush administration.”). 
 43. See Douglas B. Hindman, Knowledge Gaps, Belief Gaps, and Public Opinion about 
Health Care Reform, 89 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 585, 598–99 (2012) (finding that a 
pre-existing “belief gap” between partisans about health care reform increased the longer the 
bill was before Congress, as did a “knowledge gap” about what was actually in the bill, provid-
ing evidence of differential influence of separate media outlets).  
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ed, since these outlets remain the primary source of news coverage 
for only a small fraction of the American public.44 
In short, there are a whole range of interlocking factors that con-
tribute to our factionalized politics, and the deepening hostility that 
has accompanied it. It should surprise no one that polarized America 
is reflected in Congress. It is thus a less-than-persuasive critique to 
argue that gerrymandering plays only a limited role in polarization, 
because all factors play a limited role. Our challenge is not to identify 
the non-existent, single smoking gun. It is instead to understand that 
polarization is preventing our political institutions from functioning 
and to identify solutions, all of which will necessarily be partial, that 
can help reduce the polarization and allow those institutions to work 
more effectively in formulating responses to public policy challenges. 
Seen through this lens, the role of gerrymandering comes more 
clearly into focus—as does the value of ending it. While partisan re-
districting did not cause polarization, it has played a role in worsen-
ing the situation, bringing its effects from the political discourse into 
the House, and creating congressional districts that either compel or 
incentivize members of Congress to take the most extreme stands and 
work in the most adversarial way. In other words, gerrymandering 
has made things worse—and getting rid of it can improve  
the situation. 
B.  Non-partisan Districting Will Reduce Polarization in the House 
The Pennsylvania congressional delegation is a prime example of 
the problem we face, and amply demonstrates why moving to non-
partisan districting will improve the situation. After redistricting that 
took place following the 2010 Census, Pennsylvania’s districts were 
drawn to favor the Republican Party, which had taken control of the 
state government in the GOP’s sweeping victory in the 2010 elec-
tions.45 One result of their redistricting efforts was a delegation that 
 
 44. See, e.g., Lexington, Why Fox News Is Less to Blame For Polarised Politics Than 
You Think, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2013),  http://www.economist.com/blogs/lexington/2013 
/03/media-and-political-polarisation (“Fox News, the highest-rated cable news channel, has an 
average primetime audience of about 2m, or about 0.7% of the population.”). While the aver-
age primetime audience may understate the audience during “peak” political seasons, such as 
just before an election, the truth remains that the cable news channels do not attract a large 
enough pool of viewers to “explain the growing ferocity of American democracy[.]” Id. 
 45. Early in 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the districts the state 
legislature had drawn, finding them to have been a partisan gerrymander in violation of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 
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favored Republicans thirteen to five after the 2012 elections, even 
though Democratic congressional candidates actually earned more 
votes in Pennsylvania than their Republican opponents in 2012.46 
But the main point I want to make is not about the partisan     
split itself. I am concerned about the resulting, and deep, ideological      
divide that follows when districts are gerrymandered in this fashion. 
Look at the results in the five Democratically-held districts 
in Pennsylvania: 
 
1st District 
Robert Brady* (Dem) 85.0% (225,985) 
John Featherman(GOP) 15.0%  (39,736) 
 
2nd District 
Chaka Fattah*(Dem) 89.4% ( 301,869) 
Robert Mansfield(GOP) 9.4% (31,648) 
Jim Foster (Ind) 1.3% (4,243) 
 
13th District 
Allyson Schwartz*(Dem) 68.9% (204,686) 
Joe Rooney(GOP) 31.1% (92,308) 
 
14th District 
Mike Doyle*(Dem) 76.9% ( 249,012) 
Hans Lessmann(GOP) 23.1%  (74,955) 
 
 
2018). Trying to deal with the problem of partisan gerrymandering through litigation has been 
tried—and to this point, failed—in the federal courts. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 
(2004) (four-Justice plurality holds that partisan gerrymandering is a non-justiciable political 
question for lack of judicially manageable standards to decide cases; Justice Kennedy concurs 
and says that no standard was presented in Vieth, but it is possible one could be developed). 
Fourteen years after Vieth, the Supreme Court considered yet another attempt by plaintiffs to 
come up with a “judicially manageable standard” sufficient to render the question justiciable but 
the Court evaded by the question by holding that the plaintiffs had not established their stand-
ing, remanding the case for consideration of that issue. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.Ct. 1916 
(2018). 
 46. Democratic candidates earned 2,722,490 votes across Pennsylvania’s eighteen dis-
tricts in 2012, an average of 151,249 votes per district. Their Republican opponents earned 
2,651,901 votes, an average of 147,327 votes per district. See 2012 Pennsylvania House Results, 
POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.politico.com/2012-election/results/house/pennsylvania 
/ (giving election results in each district). Given neutral districting, the expected result of this 
nearly-even split of the state electorate would have been a 10-8 or a 9-9 split of the delegation, 
rather than a lopsided 13-5 outcome in either party’s favor. 
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17th District 
Matthew Cartwright(Dem) 60.5% (157,629) 
Laureen Cummings (GOP) 39.5% (102,754) 
 
* - Incumbent 
 
Each of these Democrats, mostly incumbents, won his or her seat 
with over 60% of the vote. All but newcomer Matt Cartwright won 
with more than twice as many votes as the Republican in the race. If 
any of them were to face a genuine threat in these districts, it would 
come from a primary within the Democratic Party rather than a Re-
publican challenger in the general election. Second only to the need 
to raise money for the next campaign, the most important priority for 
any of these Pennsylvania Democrats is to stay true to the party’s 
ideological and political agenda. These representatives have little or 
no incentive to cater to the few Republicans, and ideological con-
servatives, among their constituents by shifting or moderating their 
positions on issues that might be particularly important to such vot-
ers. The only result they might see from working or compromising 
with Republicans would be to increase the chance of a primary chal-
lenge—the one time in the electoral process in these districts when a 
Democratic incumbent could be vulnerable to a well-funded chal-
lenger basing a campaign on the premise that they had not been suf-
ficiently in tune to the strong Democratic leanings of the district. 
At least one of the Pennsylvania winners in 2012 would hardly 
need to be taught the lesson that being a moderate can lead to politi-
cal peril. Rep. Matt Cartwright won a contested Democratic primary 
in which he ousted ten-term incumbent Tim Holden, whom he por-
trayed as too conservative for the strongly Democratic district.47 And 
in fact, Cartwright had a point; Holden was one of the most con-
servative Democrats in the House.48 He was strongly pro-life, at 
 
 47. See Scott Bland, Cartwright Defeats Holden in Pa. 17th District Democratic Prima-
ry, NAT’L J. (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/126968/cartwright-defeats-
holden-pa-17th-district-democratic-primary? (“Holden, a battle-seasoned veteran first elected 
in 1992, had been repeatedly targeted by Republicans over the years, but his independent, Blue 
Dog Democratic credentials consistently swayed electorates to his side. This year, though, he 
was caught from the left by Cartwright, who argued that Holden was too conservative to repre-
sent the new, more liberal-leaning 17th District.”). 
 48. See Sponsorship Analysis of Rep. Tim Holden, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us 
/congress/members/tim_holden/400183 (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (showing Rep. Holden’s 
“ideology score” as being almost perfectly in the center of the whole House—one of the most 
conservative Democrats but to the left of every Republican). 
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times earning a 0% rating from the National Abortion Rights Action 
League and a 100% rating from the National Right to Life Commit-
tee.49 He had (at best) a mixed record on LGBT rights, having voted 
for constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage and for a 
ban on adoptions by gay men and lesbians in Washington, D.C.50 On 
the other hand, Holden supported President Obama’s stimulus pro-
gram, and had a strongly pro-labor voting record.51 
I could go on listing Representative Holden’s lack of orthodoxy, 
but the point is that he was a loyal Democrat on many bread-and-
butter issues, while far from the party’s mainstream on other issues of 
great importance to many of the party faithful. The Pennsylvania 
17th District, which the GOP-controlled Pennsylvania Legislature 
had made more Democratic in redistricting so that other districts 
could be left with stronger Republican majorities, was attuned to the 
issues on which challenger Cartwright could emphasize incumbent 
Holden’s most conservative positions. Holden was not just vulnera-
ble; he was doomed. 
Once he took office, Cartwright’s positions differed noticeably 
from those taken by Holden. He applauded52 the Supreme Court’s 
decisions striking down the Defense of Marriage Act53 and clearing 
the way for same-sex marriage in California.54 In June 2013, he also 
 
 49. See Tim Holden on Abortion, ONTHEISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/PA 
/Tim_Holden.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (setting forth in summary fashion Rep. Holden’s 
votes, positions, and ratings from interest groups on key issues). 
 50. See Tim Holden on Civil Rights, ONTHEISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/PA 
/Tim_Holden.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (listing votes for constitutional amendments to 
bar same-sex marriage in 2004 and 2006, and for the D.C. adoption bill in 1999). In 2007, how-
ever, Holden did support the Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA), to bar job discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id.  
 51. See Tim Holden on Corporations, ONTHEISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/PA/ 
Tim_Holden.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (noting Holden’s vote for $825 billion economic 
recovery package in January 2009, as well as his 100% rating from the United Food and Com-
mercial Workers International Union and other pro-labor votes). 
 52. See Matthew Cartwright, Cartwright Applauds SCOTUS Ruling Paving the Way 
Towards “Equality for All,” VOTE SMART (June 26, 2013), http://votesmart.org/public-
statement/796677/cartwright-applauds-scotus-ruling-paving-the-way-towards-equality-for-
all#.UdiiEPm1GrY (“I applaud both rulings made by the Supreme Court this morning. The 
Defense of Marriage Act treated loving, committed gay and lesbian couples as a separate and 
lesser class of people. The Supreme Court has righted that wrong, and our country is better off 
for it.”). 
 53. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (Section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act is unconstitutional as intrusion into state authority over marriage and in failing to 
accord equal dignity to same-sex couples’ relationships). 
 54. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (proponents of state ballot initiative 
banning recognition of same-sex marriage lack particularized injury and thus standing to appeal 
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voted against a high-profile abortion-related bill, the “Pain Capable 
Unborn Child Protection Act,”55 which passed the House almost en-
tirely along party-lines56—a bill which certainly would have had Rep. 
Holden’s support were he still in the House. Rep. Cartwright is fit-
ting comfortably into the norm of the House Democratic caucus (on-
ly six Democrats supported the abortion bill, for example), and mak-
ing it almost unimaginable that he would be challenged in a primary 
the way he challenged Holden in 2012.57 Given the partisan make-up 
of the district, Cartwright is highly unlikely to be unseated unless he 
is challenged from the left, since he has already survived what is typi-
cally a new member’s most vulnerable race—his or her first run  
for re-election. 
Thus, one important upshot of the districting in Pennsylvania 
(which was done principally to give a huge partisan edge to Republi-
cans) was to move the Democratic caucus in the state to the left, and 
thus increase partisan polarization in the House. Even if having more 
progressive Democrats in Congress happens to be a “good” result 
from an individual’s perspective, that outcome should not be a side 
effect of artificial manipulation of district lines for partisan advantage. 
It should result from liberals convincing voters to elect candidates 
like Cartwright, and the progressive positions they support, in com-
petitive districts. In other words, the political framework within  
 
adverse district court judgment striking down the initiative). 
 55. See H.R. 1797, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (showing passage of bill by House on 
June 18, 2013, and referral to Senate Judiciary Committee on June 19, along with summary of 
provisions). 
 56. See Linda Feldmann, House GOP Passes Major Antiabortion Bill. Why Democrats 
Are Pleased, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 18, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ 
DC-Decoder/2013/0618/House-GOP-passes-major-antiabortion-bill.-Why-Democrats-are-
pleased.-video (“The Republican-controlled House of Representatives on Tuesday passed the 
most significant  legislation in 10 years: the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, which 
would ban abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy. The bill, which passed 228 to 196 on a most-
ly party-line vote, goes directly against the holding of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court ruling 
that legalized abortion nationwide.”). 
 57. In 2014, Cartwright was in fact not challenged in a primary, and coasted to re-
election. See Pennsylvania’s 17th Congressional District Elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania’s_17th_Congressional_District_elections,_2014 (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2019). His reelection campaign was closer in 2016, almost certainly due to the more 
general Republican success in the state during the Trump-Clinton election, but he did win 54-
46%. See Pennsylvania’s 17th Congressional District Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania%27s_17th_Congressional_District_election,_2016 (last 
visited Mar. 22, 2019).  
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which the parties and candidates operate should make winning        
political arguments and debates the only genuine, reliable path to po-
litical triumph. 
To put the point another way: would any progressive really be-
lieve the Pennsylvania trade-off is worth it? Pennsylvania created a 
district that was solidly blue enough to send Rep. Holden packing, 
and elect a more liberal House member like Matthew Cartwright, 
while making the rest of the Democrats in the delegation safer be-
cause of the similarly-large majorities in their districts. In return, 
Democrats paid the price of a thirteen to five Republican advantage 
in the Pennsylvania House delegation, even after a 2012 election in 
which Democrats received more votes for Congress statewide. The 
GOP-held state legislature packed so many Democratic voters into 
those five districts that they were almost certain to be won by strong 
liberal Democrats. But instead of splitting the eighteen seats nine to 
nine in a state where that is how the votes split (Democrats won 
slightly more votes, but the parties fought something very close to a 
fifty to fifty draw), Democrats lost a net of four seats in a closely-
divided House. 
The difference made by drawing compact, non-partisan districts 
can be seen by looking at the change in the balance of the districts 
that resulted from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to 
strike down the old lines and draw new ones itself in early 2018.58 I 
have already discussed the strong partisan divisions that characterized 
the districts the Pennsylvania Legislature drew in 2010; there is an 
important contrast to the Supreme Court’s new districts. Nate Cohn, 
Matthew Bloch, and Kevin Quealy drew revealing side-by-side com-
parisons of the districts:59 
 
 2010 Map/2018 Map 
District One: Clinton +61 / Clinton +48 
District Two: Clinton +83/Clinton +84 
District Three: Trump +26/ Trump +20 
District Four: Trump +21/Trump +9 
District Five : Trump +29/Trump +43 
 
 58. See supra note 45 and accompanying text discussing decision in League of Women 
Voters v. Commonwealth. 
 59. Nate Cohn, Matthew Bloch & Kevin Quealy, The New Pennsylvania Congressional 
Map, District by District, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2018/02/19/upshot/pennsylvania-new-house-districts-gerrymandering.html.  
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District Six: Clinton +1/Clinton +9 
District Seven: Clinton +2/Clinton +28 
District Eight: Clinton +2/ Clinton +2 
District Nine: Trump +43/Trump +46 
District Ten: Trump +36/ Trump +36 
District Eleven: Trump +24/Trump +34 
District Twelve: Trump +21/Trump +3 
District Thirteen: Clinton +34/ Clinton +19 
District Fourteen: Clinton +35/Clinton +27 
District Fifteen: Trump+8/Clinton +1 
District Sixteen: Trump +7/Trump +26 
District Seventeen: Trump +10/Trump +10 
District Eighteen: Trump +20/Trump +29 
 
In both instances, there are six districts that can reasonably be 
characterized as competitive (neither side had a partisan advantage of 
more than ten points in the 2016 presidential election).60 But the new 
lines produce a partisan division that more closely resembles the state 
as a whole (instead of having a twelve to six division between Trump 
and Clinton-leaning districts, the new map has a ten to eight divide), 
and more important, has a lower median gap (reduced from +14 Re-
publican to +3).61 It is important not to overstate the impact of end-
ing a partisan gerrymander like the one that had created the 2010 
lines in Pennsylvania—the new lines have no more truly competitive 
districts (if we count a district as competitive if it has a partisan divide 
of 10% or less) than existed before; there were six such districts using 
both the 2010 and the 2018 lines. In this respect, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court could have done an even better job of creating dis-
tricts that would encourage moderates to run, and (as important) en-
courage all candidates to take more moderate positions than they 
would in partisan districts, since the winning margin is likely to be 
found in those decisive voters who are not part of either side’s base. 
Creating such districts should be a key priority of non-partisan dis-
tricting commissions, alongside respecting and reflecting the partisan 
balance of the state’s electorate to the greatest extent possible. 
The basic story of the gerrymandering problem can be told, from 
either side of the partisan aisle, nationwide. In states where Demo-
 
 60.  In 2010, those are Districts Six, Seven, Eight, Fifteen, Sixteen, and Seventeen. Un-
der the 2018 map, they are Districts Four, Six, Eight, Twelve, Fifteen, and Seventeen. 
 61. See Cohn, Bloch & Quealy, supra note 59. 
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crats hold sway, they can and do draw the lines so that Republicans 
can elect highly partisan, deep-red Republicans, but in a relatively 
small number of districts compared to their percentage of the 
statewide vote. It just so happens that, because of the outcome of the 
2010 elections in which Republicans did particularly well, the GOP 
was able to do this in more states in the most recent cycle of post-
Census redistricting. But what goes around can come around, and for 
our political system as a whole, it does not matter which party can 
take advantage of the situation at any particular time, whether it be 
immediately after a Census (when redistricting is mandatory)62, or 
mid-decade (when state legislatures have sometimes decided to take it 
up when partisan advantage is there to be gained)63 The result is to 
add to the polarization and partisanship that locks us into a vicious 
cycle of gridlock, for which each side blames the other, which leads 
to greater polarization, and then even more gridlock. 
Consider the world that confronted a Republican member of the 
House when the immigration reform bill came before Congress in 
2013. Let us assume that his or her district is 65% Republican and 
voted overwhelmingly for every Republican presidential nominee 
since John McCain in 2008. In this scenario the political truth is that 
supporting the bill that passed the Senate64 (or signaling a willingness 
to do so on terms that would put a deal with Democrats within reach) 
would make it more likely he or she would face a serious primary 
challenge, whereas opposing the bill would carry very little political 
risk. This is particularly true in the post-Trump world, in which the 
GOP center shifted sharply on the immigration issue in particular, in 
a way that makes supporting an immigration compromise all the 
more risky for a typical Republican House member. A Democratic 
challenger in the general election would surely criticize the no vote, 
 
 62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned 
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respec-
tive Numbers . . . The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first 
Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten 
Years . . . .”). 
 63. See Charlie Cook, The Cook Report - Mid-Decade Redistricting Growing More 
Popular, NAT’L J. (Feb. 26, 2005, 7:00 AM), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/420658/cook-
report-mid-decade-redistricting-growing-more-popular? (noting that mid-decade redistricting 
began with move by GOP-held Texas legislature in 2003, prior to which it was “unheard-of in 
modern-day American politics, except under court order,” but that Texas’ move quickly spurred 
proposals in California, Illinois, Georgia, and New Mexico in the ‘00s). 
 64. See Seung Min Kim, Senate Passes Immigration Bill, POLITICO (June 28, 2013, 4:25 
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/immigration-bill-2013-senate-passes-93530.html 
(discussing bipartisan vote and compromises over provisions of the bill that passed the Senate). 
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but with only 35% Democratic voters in the district, that attack is 
likely to do very little damage to this incumbent’s position.65 
No matter what happened on immigration in 2013, it should be 
emphasized that no single vote, and no one position on an issue, will 
decide the fate of each party’s House incumbents. While so many of 
today’s districts are highly polarized, that does not mean their voters 
look at only one issue. For this reason, opposing an immigration bill 
will not assure Democrats a primary challenger, and supporting it 
will not make certain that Republicans will get one. But each depar-
ture from the party line—whether it be on abortion, gun control, 
immigration, health care, raising the debt ceiling, or others—creates 
opportunities for the next Matt Carpenter to seize upon. In the case 
of Rep. Brad Wenstrup, who ousted Rep. Jean Schmidt in a GOP 
primary in Ohio’s heavily-Republican Second District in 2012, the 
issues were her votes to raise the debt ceiling, in favor of the Wall 
Street rescue package in 2008 . . . and a picture of her kissing Presi-
dent Obama as he entered the House chamber to deliver a State of 
the Union Address, all of which were used heavily against her by 
Wenstrup in the campaign.66 These issues—if we can call greeting 
the President of the United States an issue—might have been trou-
blesome to a Republican incumbent in any district, but they were al-
most certain to open the door to a successful challenge in Ohio’s 
Second District, one of the most solidly Republican in Ohio.67 
A similarly dramatic story unfolded in 2016 in North Carolina’s 
Second District, where former Tea Party favorite Representative 
Renee Ellmers was ousted in a bruising Republican primary in which 
 
 65. Of course, a 65-35% partisan split in this hypothetical ignores independents, who 
almost certainly would make up a quarter or more of the voters. The numbers in the text are 
meant simply to illustrate the way in which creating districts with a heavy partisan split in one 
direction or the other tends to affect the ability and willingness of House members to reach 
across the aisle to achieve compromise and pass legislation. If the numbers in the district were 
50% Republican, 25% Democratic, and 25% independent, the point would remain the same. 
 66. See John Gizzi, Rep. Jean Schmidt: Why the Four-Term Ohio Congresswoman 
Lost, HUM. EVENTS (Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.humanevents.com/2012/03/11/rep-jean-
schmidt-why-the-fourterm-ohio-congresswoman-lost/ (discussing votes and images that were 
harmful to Schmidt among Republican primary voters). 
 67. One indication of how safe Ohio’s Second District is for Republicans is that despite 
running without the advantages of incumbency, Wenstrup managed to run up the fourth-
highest margin of victory of the twelve Republicans who won Ohio congressional seats in 2012; 
the three who ran ahead of him in other districts were all incumbents, and several other incum-
bents did not manage to win with margins approaching Wenstrup’s 59% of the vote. See 2012 
Ohio House Results, POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.politico.com/2012-election/ 
results/house/ohio/ (giving election results in each district).  
MARCOSSON, FOR PUBLICIATION, 4.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  5:28 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 33 
248 
her opponents ran to her right, highlighting votes she had cast on 
such issues as abortion, the debt ceiling, and the Export-Import 
Bank—all of which became hot-button issues with grass-roots con-
servatives.68 The message of Ellmers’ defeat to any incumbent—
Democrat or Republican—is that straying from party-line positions 
in a district hard-wired to be filled with the party faithful is a perfect 
way to end your time in Congress. 
It also works the other way. That is, there is evidence that mem-
bers of the House who do not represent highly polarized, extreme 
districts can contribute to moderation and compromise. Interestingly, 
in the spring of 2018, a select group of approximately twenty-five 
Republican House members tried to force Speaker Paul Ryan to al-
low a vote on a compromise immigration bill via use of the discharge 
petition.69 Although they represented a fraction of the GOP caucus, 
their signatures could—if every one of the 191 Democrats signed the 
petition—get the petition right up to the 218 threshold to force a 
vote. Critically, these Republicans represented districts atypical for 
the contemporary GOP, with heavy representation of minority vot-
ers. These Republican members fear that failure or refusal to com-
promise on the issue could be fatal, or at least hazardous, to their 
reelection chances. Members of the House who are motivated to 
compromise is precisely what our political system needs more of: 
members who come from swing districts, perceiving their interests to 
lie in reaching across the aisle. 
Obviously, we need more than anecdotal examples of the effect of 
both strongly partisan districts adding to the polarization in Con-
gress, and closely-drawn districts reducing it. While it is difficult to 
 
 68. See Simone Pathé, The Rise and (Probable) Fall of Renee Ellmers, ROLL CALL 
(Mar. 21, 2016, 7:13 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/renee-ellmers-primary-fight-
life (discussing uphill primary fight Rep. Ellmers was waging against fellow incumbent George 
Holding, because their districts had been merged in court-ordered redistricting, and her votes 
had made her vulnerable); Elena Schneider, Renee Ellmers Is First GOP Incumbent Knocked 
Off in Primary, POLITICO (June 7, 2016, 8:43 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/ 
holding-defeats-ellmers-in-member-versus-member-primary-224032.  
 69. See Don Wolfensberger, Immigration Discharge Petition Approaches Final Show-
down, HILL (June 4, 2018, 10:15 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/390503-
immigration-discharge-petition-approaches-final-showdown (discussing effort by moderate 
Republicans to reach the 218 signatory threshold to compel House leadership to permit a vote 
on a number of immigration proposals). Under House Rule XV(c), a discharge petition can re-
move any bill from committee after the bill has been in committee for thirty days, if the dis-
charge petition is signed by a majority of the members of the House. See RULES OF THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES XV, clause 2, 115th Cong. (2016), https://www.govinfo. 
gov/content/pkg/HMAN-115/pdf/HMAN-115.pdf. 
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quantify the impact of redistricting on polarization in the House of 
Representatives, evidence is strong that there is a relationship. A 
study by Professor Corbett Grainger of voting patterns among the 
members of the California state legislature from the 1960s to the 
2000s shows that during periods when districts were drawn by the 
state’s politicians (i.e., by the state legislature and governor), the dis-
tricts were both less competitive, and the representatives elected 
tended to take more extreme positions.70 Professor Grainger’s study 
of the relationship between districting methods and voting patterns 
in California was particularly intriguing because the State shifted 
back and forth between drawing district lines through its political 
system and via non-partisan means,71 and as they shifted, the voting 
patterns of the State’s legislators shifted along with them, moderating 
when the lines had been drawn by court-appointed special masters or 
non-partisan commissions and becoming more extreme when the 
lines were drawn by the State’s politicians. Democrats tended to 
move to the left,72 while Republicans moved to the right,73 when rep-
resenting districts that were politically drawn. 
Not surprisingly, the same study shows that politically-drawn dis-
tricts in California have been substantially less competitive than those 
drawn non-politically.74 As Professor Grainger puts it: 
 
 70. See Corbett A. Grainger, Redistricting and Polarization: Who Draws the Lines in 
California?, 53 J. L. & ECON. 545 (2010). 
 71. As Grainger notes, the non-partisan line-drawing in California during the periods we 
studied occurred because the state was “forced” into it when its politicians could not agree on a 
redistricting plan, throwing the process into the courts which then imposed a plan on the state. 
See id. at 548–49 (describing impasses after 1970 and 1990 Censuses). More recently, Califor-
nia has adopted a system of districting by non-partisan commission, bypassing the state legisla-
ture and governor entirely.  
 72. Id. at 554 (“Democrats’ scores . . . reveal a trend in which they became more liberal 
in legislatively drawn districts and more moderate in panel-drawn districts. Specifically, being in 
a panel-drawn district in the 1970s is associated with a decrease of more than 11 points in the 
average Democrat’s CFL score. When districts were legislatively drawn in the 1980s, the aver-
age Democrat’s score became more liberal by nearly 14 points. In the 1990s, average scores 
again decreased slightly by approximately 3 points. The CLCV scores for Democrats show 
a similar pattern, increasing significantly after redistricting in the 1980s and decreasing again 
by approximately 17 points after redistricting in the 1990s.”). 
 73. Id. at 554 Table 2 (showing that Republican legislators’ votes became sharply more 
conservative in the 1980s, when districts had been drawn politically, that the trend towards po-
larization by GOP members of Congress reduced significantly in the 1990s when districts were 
drawn by courts, and then accelerated again after partisan districting after the 2000 Census). 
 74. Id. at 555–57 (discussing various measures showing that California legislative races 
were substantially closer in years when districts had been drawn in non-political ways). 
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[C]ritical to the polarization hypothesis is the argument that         
legislatively drawn districts are less competitive (relative to panel-
drawn districts), which allows legislators to take more extreme posi-
tions    in their roll call votes . . . [T]here is evidence that the mar-
gins of victory in legislatively drawn districts have been much larger 
than . . . those in panel-drawn districts in the California state legis-
lature. [This] pattern . . . suggests that elections under panel-drawn       
districts are more competitive, on average, for members of         
both parties.75 
Legislators like to be re-elected. When they represent highly partisan 
districts, they take highly partisan positions. When they represent 
competitive districts, they tend to take positions that allow them to 
appeal to more of the swing voters, who often determine the outcome 
of the elections in these districts.76 Or at the very least, they must be 
attentive to the concerns of the voters who actually comprise their 
district—that is, voters whose views stretch across the ideological 
spectrum, instead of being highly concentrated on the right or left—
and show a willingness to engage in a dialog with constituents on is-
sues of disagreement. In and of itself, this represents the very en-
gagement that can be an antidote to extreme polarization. 
Some scholars have criticized the idea that there is a relationship 
between partisan districting and legislative polarization by creating a 
wildly exaggerated version of the claimed relationship, and then de-
bunking it. Take this passage from a 2009 article by Professors 
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal: 
Consequently only conservative Republicans can win in conserva-
tive Republican districts just as liberal Democrats dominate liberal 
Democratic districts. Because redistricting no longer produces 
moderate, bipartisan, or heterogeneous districts, moderates cannot 
win election to the House. 
This narrative is attractive not only because of analytical elegance, 
but also because it suggests a single, perhaps even feasible, solution 
to what ails the American polity: take the politics out of redistrict-
ing. Districts drawn by neutral experts and judges would be hetero-
geneous and politically moderate. Appealing to independents would 
 
 75. Id. at 555. 
 76. Id. at 559 (“[A]s seats become safer, Republicans take more conservative positions 
and Democrats take more liberal voting positions. Similarly, as districts become more competi-
tive (again in terms of voter registration), legislators tend to take more moderate positions. This 
finding . . . suggests that panel-drawn districts (relative to legislatively drawn districts) are more 
competitive and lead to more moderate voting behavior by members of both parties.”). 
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become the key to winning election, and polarization would become 
a thing of the past.77 
If anyone believes anything of the sort—that gerrymandering is the 
sole (or even the principal) cause of polarization, or that its elimina-
tion would make polarization “a thing of the past”—they have been 
remarkably quiet about it. Instead, the real issues are whether parti-
san districting contributes to polarization (even if it has been mainly a 
product of the growth of our polarized politics, rather than a root 
cause), and whether eliminating it would reduce polarization. There 
are, to my knowledge, no Pollyannas participating in this debate. 
Indeed, even McCarty and his colleagues agree with the premise 
that gerrymandering contributes to polarization.78 They also 
acknowledge that the evidence is mixed on whether there is a correla-
tion between extremely homogenous districts and more extreme and 
polarized voting records on the part of the members of Congress who 
represent them.79 But they then proceed from finding the evidence 
mixed, and inconclusive, to the unjustified conclusion that doing 
something to reduce polarization is not among the “reasons to do 
something about gerrymandering.”80 
A more nuanced view recognizes that if gerrymandering contrib-
utes to polarization, then eliminating it can play a part in dealing with 
polarization. Mann and Ornstein have it about right: 
[R]edistricting makes a difficult situation considerably worse. Law-
makers have become more insular and more attentive to their ideo-
logical bases as their districts have become more partisan and ho-
mogeneous. Districts have become more like echo chambers, 
reinforcing members’ ideological predispositions with fewer dis-
senting voices back home or fewer disparate groups of constituents 
to consider in representation. The impact shows in their behavior; 
and reform of the way in which legislative boundaries are redrawn 
would make a difference.81 
 
 77. Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause 
Polarization, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666, 666 (2009). 
 78. Id. at 667 (arguing that the gerrymandering effects may constitute 10-15% of the 
increase in polarization since the 1970s). 
 79. Id. at 668 (setting forth evidence on both sides of the correlation question). 
 80. Id. at 679. 
 81. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW 
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 230 (2006) [herein-
after MANN & ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH] (discussing the “unique role of the Senate, 
which was designed by the framers to slow the process and add to its deliberative nature”); see 
also MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 32, at 144–45 (arguing that 
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The disappearance of a genuine moderate presence in Congress has 
been part of the problem, and steps that have the potential to bring at 
least some moderate voices back, from both parties, would be a step 
back from the brink of a crisis in our ability to govern ourselves. On a 
national basis, even forty to fifty districts drawn with a different parti-
san mix—with somewhere closer to a 50/50 split, rather than 60% or 
more of the district reliably voting one way or the other—would 
change the character of the House by restoring ideological overlap 
and a core moderate caucus. 
This is not to say that we should want a House that is filled with 
moderates, or in which the parties overlap to such a degree that they 
are indistinguishable. The political climate in contemporary America 
is, after all, characterized by bold and extreme differences between 
the parties, and between adherents of the left and right. Congress 
should reflect that condition of our political life. And, fortunately, no 
one believes that anything we could or would do when it comes to 
redistricting would eliminate the bomb-throwers of the left and the 
right from the House. These Members represent the legitimate pas-
sion in our system that comes from the Tea Party on the right and 
the Kossacks on the left. But Congress should reflect the fact that 
America also has its share of political moderates as well. 
There is another simple reason why we should address polariza-
tion by ending political redistricting. There are really few, if any, 
other steps we can take to respond to polarization. Think about the 
various factors that have contributed to our polarized political cli-
mate. The realignment of the parties along rigid ideological lines is 
not likely to reverse itself.82 And if we are stuck with realignment, 
 
“gerrymandering accounts for at most a modest share of the recent polarization,” and that re-
form “is no panacea for the ideological polarization of the two parties’ constituencies.”). 
 82. See Carroll Doherty, 7 Things to Know About Polarization in America, PEW RES. 
CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/7-things-to-know-
about-polarization-in-america/ (“Republicans and Democrats are further apart ideologically 
than at any point in recent history, . . . [and] [g]rowing numbers of Republicans and Democrats 
express highly negative views of the opposing party.”). The study discussed in the Doherty 
piece gives no reason for optimism that partisan polarization will change any time soon. Ameri-
cans take a dim view of those whose politics and party identification differ from their own. Id. 
(“The share of Republicans who have very unfavorable opinions of the Democratic Party has 
jumped from 17% to 43% in the last 20 years. Similarly, the share of Democrats with very neg-
ative opinions of the Republican Party also has more than doubled, from 16% to 38%.”). And 
they have little interest in meaningful compromise. Id. (“To those on the ideological right and 
left, compromise now means that their side gets more of what it wants. About six-in-ten across-
the-board liberals (62%) say the optimal deal between President Barack Obama and the GOP 
should be closer to what Obama wants. About as many consistent conservatives (57%) say an 
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then we are also stuck with the strong incentive that realignment has 
created for the parties to deploy their vast machinery of consultants 
and political action committees to engage in a near-permanent cam-
paign of attacks to demonize their political opponents. This source of 
polarization is not going away. Even if we wanted to, there is not 
much we can do to silence or change the tone of ideologically driven 
cable news stations and internet sites. It is difficult to see what re-
forms would effectively eliminate the presence and salience of hot-
button wedge issues, or how we could deal with the existence of      
interest groups organized around them who have numerous incen-
tives to make the politics surrounding those issues as incendiary       
as possible.83 
In short, there is not much we can do to reduce the harmful ef-
fects of polarized politics in a highly polarized nation. Even if gerry-
mandering is only a partial cause of the problem, non-partisan redis-
tricting will nevertheless moderate the extent to which polarization is 
felt in the House of Representatives, and it will improve the chances 
for legislative compromise to take place across ideological and parti-
san lines. It is a step worth taking as one of the few things we can ac-
tually do to constructively deal with the problem. 
C.  The Constitutional Solution: Mandatory Non-partisan 
Redistricting 
Assuming we even wish to reduce the effects of polarization in 
the House of Representatives, ending partisan gerrymandering is our 
only real hope.84 The way to do this is to require states to follow the 
 
agreement should be more on the GOP’s terms.”). 
 83. It is hardly a coincidence that the most divisive issues in our politics are also the ones 
in which we can easily identify high-profile interest groups, many of which are famous for their 
polarizing approach to their issue, whether it be in how they campaign against politicians they 
perceive to be adverse (or insufficiently supportive) on their core issue, or in how they lobby. 
The National Rifle Association, for example, utilizes the strongest possible rhetoric to charac-
terize the actions, plans, and motivations of supporters of gun control. See, e.g., Christina 
Wilkie, NRA Fundraising Email Steps up Anti-Obama Rhetoric, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 17, 
2013, 8:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/17/nra-fundraising-email_n_2499 
853.html (quoting letter written by NRA chief lobbyist Chris Cox, that “Obama and ‘anti-gun 
politicians are on an all-out crusade’ to ‘ban your guns and abolish every last sacred right you 
have under the Second Amendment . . . until they reduce your freedom to ashes.’”). 
 84. I say it is the “only real hope” fully aware, of course, of the almost three decades of 
the Supreme Court’s tortured attempts to decide whether partisan gerrymanders violate the 
Constitution, without thus far even being able to decide whether the cases are justiciable. See 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (holding that the Court could not discern the political-
ly manageable standards for what constitutes a political gerrymander, and upholding the consti-
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model, adopted by a number of states, pursuant to which bipartisan 
or non-partisan commissions supplant state legislatures in conducting 
districting. Accomplishing this goal would require something like this 
proposed 28th Amendment to the Constitution: 
It being the obligation of the several States to apportion their seats 
in the House of Representatives, and in light of the harmful lack of 
uniformity in the methods and standards by which that responsibil-
ity is undertaken, each State shall adopt a method for apportioning 
its seats which complies with the requirements of this provision. 
Section 1: The State shall create a Commission designed to be ei-
ther non-partisan or bi-partisan in its membership, and whose 
mandate shall be to create U.S. congressional districts that are 
compact, contiguous, as nearly equal in population as possible in 
conformity with the “one person, one vote” principle, and which 
have neither the purpose or substantial effect of favoring any politi-
cal party or partisan group. 
Section 2: Neither the Governor of a State, nor the State Legisla-
ture, shall have authority to alter, approve, or disapprove of the dis-
trict lines established by the Commission. 
Section 3: Whether a State has established a method for selecting 
members of its redistricting Commission which conforms to the re-
quirements of Section 1 of this provision, and the lawfulness of the 
districts adopted by a State Commission, shall be justiciable ques-
tions under Article III of this Constitution.85 
Currently, only nine states give commissions the primary respon-
sibility for drawing their congressional districts. 86 The proposed 28th 
 
tutionality of the lines drawn in Indiana after the 1980 census, but refusing to hold that such 
judicially manageable standards could not be developed in a future case); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 
U.S. 267 (2004) (rejecting challenge to the map drawn in Pennsylvania after the 2000 census, 
but no majority opinion left the fractured Court unable to decide whether political gerryman-
dering is a justiciable claim); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (remanding partisan ger-
rymandering challenge to address issue of the plaintiffs’ standing). Interestingly, Justice Ste-
phen Breyer, writing in 2010, ascribed such importance to this issue that Vieth was on the list 
as one of the cases that he would name if he “were . . . to have three wishes to turn dissents into 
majority opinions . . . .” STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S 
VIEW 161 (2010).  
 85. Section 3’s language providing that compliance with the prior sections of the 
Amendment is a justiciable question, including whether the lines that have been drawn have 
“the purpose or substantial effect of favoring any political party or partisan group,” would put 
an end once and for all to the Supreme Court’s wrangling with this issue in the Vieth line of 
cases.  
 86. See Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 21, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-comm 
issions-congressional-plans.aspx.  
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Amendment would impose this obligation on the remaining forty-
one. All of the nine existing state commissions are designed to be bi-
partisan in nature,87 and to have at least a partially apolitical member-
ship.88 It is worth noting that significantly more states give districting 
commissions primary authority to draw state legislative districts.89 
But even fourteen (the number of states with commissions handling 
state-level redistricting) would be a fraction of the number necessary 
to create enough competitive congressional districts to generate the 
reemergence of a moderate caucus that could alter the dynamic in the 
House. Since there is no realistic prospect that a sufficient number of 
states will voluntarily move to adopt non-partisan districting systems 
to make a difference, a constitutional solution mandating that all 
states do so is essential. 
In an effort to implement this concept, former Attorney General 
Eric Holder is spearheading an effort to address the pernicious effects 
of gerrymandering.90 While a large part of the Holder campaign is 
aimed at enhancing the Democratic Party electoral prospects,91 his 
strategy also includes efforts to establish non-partisan redistricting 
processes, regardless of which party might benefit in a particular state 
from limiting political control of the process.92 There is a clear dis-
 
 87. Id. (naming the states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, 
Montana, New Jersey, and Washington) and describing how each selects its commission’s 
members). 
 88. Id. For example, Hawaii bars any commission member from running for Congress in 
any of the two elections following redistricting, while Idaho bars anyone from serving who is an 
elected or appointed official at the time they are named to the commission. 
 89. See Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, supra note 86 (describing the 
14 states with commissions having primary authority to draw state legislative districts). 
 90. See David Daley, Eric Holder’s Battle Against Gerrymandering,  NEW YORKER 
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/eric-holders-battle-against-
gerrymandering.  
 91. Id. (discussing electoral setbacks Democrats suffered during the Obama presidency 
and the 2010s, largely as a result of Republican success in controlling redistricting in key swing 
states after the 2010 Census). Among the states that have been a central focus has been Wiscon-
sin, where the post-2010 partisan gerrymander was so effective that—when it came to the state 
legislature—“in 2012, Democratic assembly candidates earned a hundred and seventy-four 
thousand more votes than Republicans, but the G.O.P. won sixty of the ninety-nine seats.” Id. 
 92. See Alexander Burns, Eric Holder’s Group Targets All-GOP States to Attack Ger-
rymandering, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/us/politics/ 
democrats-gerrymandering-election-maps.html ([past participle] Holder’s “group is monitoring 
a number of state-level ballot initiatives that could put anti-gerrymandering laws up for a vote 
this year,” a course which Holder believes may be—where available—“the best way to” attack 
partisan gerrymandering); Benjy Sarlin, Eric Holder Leads Democrats to War on Gerryman-
dering, NBC (Feb. 7, 2018, 14:47 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/eric-
holder-leads-democrats-war-gerrymandering-n845576 (noting that Holder’s organization is 
“preparing to protect [non-partisan] commissions in states like Arizona,” and may support bal-
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tinction between a project aimed at changing the nature of the redis-
tricting process, as opposed to just giving Democrats a greater voice 
in what would remain a partisan process in most states. While Hold-
er’s effort is a laudable attempt to reverse the effects of the specific 
brand of partisan gerrymandering that occurred after the 2010 Cen-
sus, it is more important to eliminate such gerrymandering. 
Unfortunately, we encounter the very Catch-22 I mentioned at 
the outset of this article. It is extraordinarily unlikely that the same 
polarized, hyper-partisan House of Representatives, whose members 
are creatures of, and whose political survival depends upon, the polit-
ical climate that swept them into office, will turn around and vote to 
fundamentally alter the system that benefits them. For that reason, it 
is difficult to see the circumstances under which two-thirds of the 
House would vote for anything like the 28th Amendment proposed 
above. And even if that happened, ratification would require the as-
sent of three-fourths of the state legislatures, many of which engaged 
in the very partisan gerrymandering that is the source of our woes. 
We have, in short, reached a crisis in our democratic institutions 
whereby the reforms we need depend upon the cooperation of those 
who are the very reason we need reform in the first place. 
This dilemma is hardly new in our constitutional history. An 
analogous problem was at the heart of the Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in Baker v. Carr,93 where the Court held that reapportion-
ment of state legislators constitutes a justiciable political question. It 
is no exaggeration to say that in Baker the Court was confronted with 
a political system that had completely broken down. The state legis-
lature in Tennessee had refused to redraw its district lines for nearly 
fifty years, because rural legislators recognized that reapportionment 
would diminish (if not extinguish) their political power.94 The lesson 
of the Tennessee Legislature’s obstructionism is that system break-
down, under the right (or wrong) circumstances, can make reforming 
the system impossible, absent outside intervention of the type the 
Supreme Court provided in Baker. Just as those rural legislators 
would not voluntarily redistrict themselves out of power, neither will 
the members of the current House. 
 
 
lot initiatives to create them in states like Michigan). 
 93. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 94. Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 271, 272 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2009). 
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II.  LETTING THE LEGISLATURE LEGISLATE: THE TWO-
CONGRESS SOLUTION TO FILIBUSTER REFORM 
 
The Senate’s role in the legislative process is unquestionably dif-
ferent from that of the House of Representatives. The Senate has 
traditionally been the chamber in which proposals receive more 
measured, careful consideration—it is not for nothing that the Senate 
perceives itself as a genuinely deliberative body.95 But when the tools 
and procedures by which it has traditionally assured careful delibera-
tion instead become tools to simply prevent the Senate from operat-
ing, in the service of partisan gridlock or the exercise of special inter-
est influence, then the case for reform is easy to make. 
What is not as easy, however, is to find a reform that ends the ob-
struction, but simultaneously leaves a mechanism in place that pre-
serves the Senate’s legitimate function as the body in Congress that 
achieves further contemplation of (possibly) rash proposals. Some 
bills may gain currency—and quick passage—in the House of Repre-
sentatives, but may be ill-considered upon further reflection. My 
purpose in this section is two-fold: first to make the case that the fili-
buster has lost its utility as an acceptable vehicle for achieving delib-
eration in our legislative process, and then to propose a constitution-
ally-enshrined alternative that will give the Senate an opportunity to 
slow down the legislative process without bringing it to a crashing 
halt. Like the 28th Amendment proposed in the prior section, the 
29th Amendment I will discuss here is much easier said than done. 
A.  The Accelerating Abuse of the Filibuster: The Rise of the 
Individualistic and Partisan Senate 
The Senate was already in institutional trouble before the dawn 
of the 21st century. The filibuster had once been effective more as a 
threat to compel compromise than it had been as an actual legislative 
device. But more and more, it was used as a partisan tool instead. In-
stead of utilizing the background understanding that the filibuster’s 
 
 95. See MANN AND ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH, supra note 81, at 162 (discuss-
ing the “unique role of the Senate, which was designed by the framers to slow the process and 
add to its deliberative nature”); Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Gridlock Rules: Why We Need Fili-
buster Reform in the U.S. Senate, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (2013) (“The Senate was de-
signed by the Founding Fathers to be the slower, more deliberative body.”). 
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very existence could and should produce bargains that would make its 
actual use unnecessary, the minority has used it to stop opponents in 
the majority from advancing unwelcome legislation, and to signal to 
party faithful that filibustering Senators were carrying out the party’s 
pure agenda. 
In a well-functioning Senate, the fact that the minority has the 
filibuster available, if necessary, would lead the majority to respect 
reasonable requests for compromise. But at the same time, the mi-
nority will limit its demands and use the filibuster threat sparingly. 
After all, the members of the minority look forward to the time when 
they may soon be in the majority, since 1/3 of the Senate is up for 
election every two years.96 At that point, they want to be able to enact 
a sizable portion of their agenda without having to sacrifice too much 
to filibuster-backed minority demands. 
But the increase in the use of the filibuster over the last part of 
the 20th century, and since, has taken us outside the realm of a well-
functioning Senate. This increase has been unmistakable, and well-
documented. The trend began when Mike Mansfield replaced 
Lyndon Johnson as the Senate Majority Leader when the former be-
came Vice-President in 1961.97 Prior to Mansfield, filibusters had 
shut the Senate down. Because this meant the institution paid a high 
price for each episode, they were rarely utilized.98 Mansfield adopted 
a different approach, as Mann & Ornstein explain: 
Over time, he began to alter the way filibusters were handled,       
relying on a “two-track system”: that is, the Senate would let     
some of its work go on while relegating the filibustered issue to       
a separate stream of debate until cloture could be invoked, whereby 
 
 96. See Rebecca Shabad, Will the Senate Ever Kill the Filibuster?, CBS NEWS,  
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-the-senate-ever-kill-the-filibuster/ (last updated Aug. 8, 
2017, 9:42 AM) (noting that in April 2017, sixty-one Senators signed a letter expressing support 
for maintaining the legislative filibuster, even after it had been eliminated for judicial nomina-
tions, and preserving the “existing rules, practices and traditions” of the Senate). Republican 
Senator Roger Wicker of Mississippi made explicit the partisan motivation that Senators have 
to preserve the filibuster even when they are in the majority; it will not always be that way. Id. 
(“There are going to be times when the Republicans are in the majority, and there are going to 
be times when we’re in the minority . . . So I think we should tread very carefully when it deals 
with filibuster reform.”) (quoting Senator Wicker). 
 97. See Mike Mansfield: Quiet Leadership in Troubled Times, U. S. SENATE HIST. 
OFF., http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/People_Leaders_ 
Mansfield.htm. (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). 
 98. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH, supra note 81, at 81. 
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two-thirds of senators could vote to end debate and get a vote,       
or fail to get the supermajority and pull the bill from the agenda,   
effectively killing it.99 
While the Senate paid a far lower price in disruption of its busi-
ness for each filibuster, the more critical result of this shift was to 
empower those who wanted to filibuster by creating a system in 
which they could achieve their goals,100 thus making the filibuster a 
more useful tool of obstruction. The resulting increase in bills being 
killed by filibusters, in turn, created pressure for reform of the fili-
buster rules to make it easier to invoke cloture and thus break the in-
creasing number of filibusters—which succeeded in 1975, when the 
supermajority required to end a filibuster was reduced from two-
thirds of those present and voting to sixty Senators.101 
This, however, was only a temporary palliative. The longer-term 
trends that were pulling the Senate apart, and encouraging an         
increased use of the filibuster, ultimately proved much stronger, and 
even the sixty-vote threshold to break filibusters did not restore      
the balance between effectiveness for the majority and recognition of   
minority influence that had prevailed in earlier times.102 Instead,     
the use of the filibuster continued to increase over the following 
twenty-five years.103 
During this time, the parties in the Senate had also become more 
ideologically polarized. Prior to, and even through, the 1980s,      
each party caucus had a relatively wide range of views within            
its ranks. That changed dramatically by the 1990s. According to       
Professors Fleisher and Bond, the number of moderate and liberal 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 
206 (1997) (“The two-track system developed by Mansfield may have benefitted the majority in 
the short run, but its long-term consequences for the Senate have been disastrous. First . . . it 
has reduced the cost of filibustering and thus encouraged strategic filibusters.”). 
 101. Id. at 210. 
 102. See Senator Tom Harkin, Filibuster Reform: Curbing Abuse to Prevent Minority 
Tyranny in the Senate, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2011) (“Throughout my career, 
there have certainly been ideological differences and policy disagreements, but the leadership of 
the minority—sometimes Democrats and sometimes Republicans—while working to protect 
the broad interests of the minority, worked with the majority to make the system work.”). 
 103. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 31, at 87–88 (noting 
data showing that fewer than two cloture motions had to be filed to attempt to break filibusters 
in the 1970s, increasing to three per month in the 1980s, and growing even more during the 
Clinton Administration in the 1990s). 
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Republicans in the Senate shrunk from twenty-two in the 1960s to 
seven by the 1990s, while the ranks of moderate and conservative 
Democrats decreased from twenty-three to three in the same          
period.104 As they explain: 
Until the early 1980s in both the House and the Senate, each party 
contained substantial numbers of members with ideological predis-
positions outside their party mainstream. During the 1980s, the 
number of moderate and cross-pressured members began to decline 
in both parties in both chambers. This trend accelerated in the 
1990s, as the number of moderate and cross-pressured members 
plummeted. Cross­pressured liberal Republicans and conservative 
Democrats have all but disappeared from Congress.105 
When the ideology of the parties had substantial overlap, and 
each party was thus more ideologically diverse, it was far less likely 
that either party could sustain a strategy of constant or even frequent 
filibusters, because it takes a combination of party loyalty and rela-
tively high ideological concurrence to keep to the program pre-
scribed by the caucus’ leadership. 
Thus, extreme ideological polarization of the parties in the Sen-
ate gave rise to the partisan use of the filibuster as a routine tool of 
both delay and obstruction.106 These have not always been the same 
thing; some filibusters are not intended primarily to actually prevent 
enactment of the legislation at issue, but rather to simply slow down 
the routine business of the Senate, to use up the days in which the 
Senate is in session so that the majority can accomplish less.107 What 
other purpose than delay for its own sake can explain filibusters of 
 
 104. See Richard Fleisher & John R. Bond, The Shrinking Middle in the US Congress, 
34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 429, 436 tbl.1 (2004). 
 105. Id. at 435. 
 106. The breakdown in comity that has accompanied ideological polarization has also 
resulted in other uses (or misuses) of Senate rules, besides the filibuster, to delay routine busi-
ness in ways that can only be characterized as petty and harmful to the nation’s business. See 
Shaheen, supra note 95, at 9 (describing actions of anonymous Senate Republicans in refusing 
to agree to traditional unanimous consent motions allowing Senate committees to meet while 
Senate was in session, which prevented Armed Services Committee and Homeland Security 
Subcommittee from meeting even though military personnel had traveled from overseas to tes-
tify). 
 107. See Harkin, supra note 102 at 4–5 (noting that the “once rare tactic is now used or 
threatened to be used on virtually every measure and nominee, even those that enjoy near-
universal support,” including bills and nominations that ultimately passed 98-0 and 99-0 after 
the filibuster had served its purpose of delay). 
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bills that ultimately pass by votes of ninety-eight to zero, ninety to 
five, and ninety-two to four—but only after critical days of floor time 
have been wasted?108 
The filibuster’s potential to paralyze the Senate and delay its 
business even when a bill enjoys broad support is magnified by the 
Senate’s tradition of deferring to even a single Senator’s notice that 
he or she wishes to place a “hold” on a measure the Majority Leader 
would otherwise bring to the floor for consideration.109 Because a 
hold comes with the implicit threat of a filibuster, and the inevitable 
delay in accomplishing other essential Senate business that would re-
sult, “the threat of a filibuster often is sufficient to prevent a bill from 
coming to the Senate floor.”110 
So what do we get in this new era of extreme polarization be-
tween the parties, and the frequent use of holds to delay the Senate’s 
business? The troubling trend of increasing filibusters that marked 
the last quarter of the 20th century has given way to an avalanche of 
filibusters in which it has simply become routine that virtually every 
bill of any substance must have at least sixty votes to even be consid-
ered, much less pass—and to even get to that stage, the majority        
is willing to force the issue over any hold that a single Senator        
may place on the bill.111 Because of the “de facto 60 vote rule,” during 
the 111th to the 113th Congress, “the percentage of Senate floor     
activity devoted to cloture votes has been more than 50 percent 
greater than any other time since at least World War II, leaving less 
 
 108. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 31, at 90–91 (dis-
cussing three bills from the 111th Congress that ultimately passed the Senate easily but only 
after time-wasting filibusters). 
 109.  See Valerie Heitshusen & Richard S. Beth, Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate, 1 
CONG. RES. SERV. 22, 20-21 (2017), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/3d51be23-64f8-448e-
aa14-10ef0f94b77e.pdf (discussing the impact of holds as a means of signaling a Senator’s intent 
to filibuster because “a Senator who objects to allowing the bill or resolution to be called up . . . 
may back up his or her objection by filibustering a motion to proceed to its consideration,” and 
thus “majority leaders have accordingly tended to honor holds . . . in recognition that if they 
choose not to do so, they may well confront filibusters that they prefer to avoid”). 
 110. Id. at 21. See also MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 31, at 
84–85 (discussing the ways in which the use of “holds” has exacerbated the filibuster problem). 
 111. See Mimi Marziani, Jonathan Backer & Diana Kasdan, Curbing Filibuster Abuse, 1 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 15, 1 (2012), (“Even routine legislative matters and governmental 
appointments are frozen. As a matter of practice, a de facto 60-vote ‘supermajority’ requirement 
applies to all legislation.”). 
MARCOSSON, FOR PUBLICIATION, 4.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  5:28 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 33 
262 
time for consideration of substantive measures.”112 Then there is this 
astonishing fact: 
Since 2006 [through 2012], 385 cloture motions have been filed. 
This is greater than the total number of cloture motions filed in the 
70 years between 1917 (when the Cloture Rule was created) and 
1988 (the last year of Ronald Reagan’s presidency). But this meas-
ure underestimates the frequency of filibusters, as it does not even 
account for bills that are abandoned or nominations that are with-
drawn due to the mere threat of a filibuster.113 
Put another way: while filibusters increased markedly prior to 2006, 
cloture votes still never constituted more than 10% of total floor 
votes in any Congress (and usually significantly less). And since 2006, 
the increase has only accelerated. “[O]ver the past three Congresses, 
cloture votes have averaged more than 15 percent of all recorded 
votes — a 50 percent increase over the previous high during the first 
two years of President George W. Bush’s administration.”114 So the 
“previous high” came during the term of the 43rd President, and that 
dubious record of senatorial obstruction was then promptly (and re-
peatedly) bested during that of the 44th. We have entered an era in 
which the country’s business simply cannot get done, regardless of 
which party is in the majority, which party is in the White House, 
and whose programmatic ox is being gored. 
In truth, it is difficult to quantify exactly how many filibusters are 
being conducted. This is in part because the mere threat of a filibus-
ter, in the form of a hold on a bill placed by a Senator, can be suffi-
cient to make a filibuster unnecessary. The Majority Leader may ei-
ther realize it will be futile to attempt to bring the bill to the floor, 
since the votes are not there to overcome the implicit filibuster 
threat, or he may decide that the time-consuming steps that are re-
quired under Senate rules are simply not worth it, given the press of 
 
 112. Id. at 2. 
 113. Id. at 4 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). A cloture motion is provided for in 
Rule XXII(2) of the Senate’s Standing Rules, and it requires the concurrence of three-fifths of 
the Senate (i.e., 60 votes) to vote aye to the question, “Is it the sense of the Senate that the de-
bate shall be brought to a close?” See Rule XXII(2), Rules of the Senate, available at 
https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate.  
 114. Marziani, Jonathan & Kasdan, supra note 111, at 6. 
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other Senate business.115 Cloture motions are a rough proxy, but only 
a proxy, because 
there has not been one cloture motion for each filibuster. Some fili-
busters have not provoked a single cloture motion; other filibusters 
have been the subject of multiple cloture votes. Some cloture      
motions have been filed before there was any real evidence that a 
filibuster was in progress or on the Senate’s doorstep. There even 
have been cases in which cloture has been filed primarily in the 
hope of triggering the germaneness requirement on amendments 
that applies under cloture, and not for the purpose of limiting     
further debate. Yet even with these reservations, the frequency      
of cloture motions and cloture votes is the best and really the        
only   surrogate for the frequency of filibusters, however defective a 
surrogate it may be.116 
And as a “best surrogate,” cloture votes tell quite a story, as data pro-
vided by Bach to the Senate Rules Committee in 2010 shows: 
 
Number of Cloture Motions Filed/Agreed To 
67th-71st Congresses (1921-1931) 11 /3 
72nd-76th Congresses (1931-1940) 4/0 
77th-81st Congresses (1941-1950) 12/2 
82nd-86th Congresses (1951-1960) 2/0 
87th-91st Congresses (1961-1970) 28/4 
92nd-96th Congresses (1971-1980) 166/43 
97th-101st Congresses (1981-1990)  207/54 
102nd-106th Congresses (1991-2000) 358/92 
107th-111th (1st Session) Congress (2001-2009) 435/175117 
 
There were only fifty-seven cloture motions filed in the five decades 
from 1921 to 1970. Since then, the pace of their filing—and it is fair 
to infer, the pace of the underlying filibusters and threats of filibus-
ters that have provoked the need to attempt to invoke cloture—has 
accelerated. There were more cloture motions in the few short years 
 
 115. See Examining the Filibuster: Hearings Before the Comm. on Rules & Admin., 
111th Cong., 2nd Sess. 74 (2010) (testimony of Stanley Bach discussing impact of holds in ren-
dering actual filibuster unnecessary). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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from 2001 to 2009 (435) than there were in the sixty-nine years from 
1921 to 1990 (430). The Senate is simply not working as it should 
when delay becomes the norm by which business is conducted. 
B.  Borrowing from the State Constitutional Toolbox: The Two-
Congress Solution 
The conundrum we face is how to preserve the Senate’s role as a 
forum for careful consideration of the ideas of the time, while elimi-
nating the filibuster because it has become unusable in this age of 
partisan division. The answer is to be found in Louis Brandeis’ “la-
boratories of democracy”—the states.118 Many state constitutions in-
clude a mechanism for amendment that can be utilized, with some 
small adjustments, for use in the federal legislative process. Trans-
formed for our purposes, it would look like this: 
 
Amendment XXIX 
 
Sec. 1. Any bill which shall have passed the House of Representa-
tives in consecutive Congresses which is not voted upon by the full 
Senate during the first Congress shall, in the second Congress, be 
exempt from any Senate rule of procedure requiring that it receive 
more than a simple majority to be considered or passed. Upon mo-
tion of any member of the Senate, the Senate shall consider any 
such exempt bill prior to final adjournment for that session of Con-
gress, and in all cases no later than 60 calendar days after such mo-
tion having been made, and passage of the bill shall require no more 
than a simple majority of the Senators eligible to vote. Once the re-
quired Senate vote is held, if the bill does not pass, its exemption 
from normal Senate rules of procedure shall not carry over to any 
subsequent Congresses. 
Sec. 2. The Senate may amend any bill whose consideration is man-
dated pursuant to Section 1 of this provision, but no amendment 
may be considered until the bill as passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives has been subject to a vote in the Senate, and passage by a 
simple majority shall be sufficient to render the bill passed by both 
Houses. The Senate may then consider amendments, and any 
 
 118. See New State Ice Co. v. Leibman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
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passed by the Senate shall be considered by the House, and if passed 
by the House shall become part of the final legislation. 
Before we consider this proposal, however, let us pause to assess 
whether some non-constitutional ideas for reform of the Senate’s 
own rules can handle the task. After all, if there are alternatives to 
amending the Constitution that can solve a vexing problem, it is diffi-
cult to make the case for resorting to Article V.119 
One such proposal was advanced by the authors of the Brennan 
Center’s stinging critique of the Senatorial status quo. They propose 
reforming Senate rules, so that: 
The Rules should place a burden on those obstructing action pre-
ferred by the majority. This can be accomplished by amending the 
Senate Rules to require at least 40 votes to sustain a filibuster rather 
than requiring a supermajority to break a filibuster. Similarly, fili-
bustering senators should be required to stay on the Senate floor 
and actually debate, as was true in the past. By ensuring that there 
are costs associated with the filibuster, the minority will be forced 
to decide what issues merit the time, energy, and lost political capi-
tal of obstruction.120 
Unfortunately, such well-intentioned proposals are inadequate to 
the task at hand, for at least three reasons. First, the Senate has 
proved itself incapable of adopting any new rule to curb filibusters of 
legislation. The fact is that Senators like the power that accrues to 
them as single members of the Senate to delay the agenda of their 
colleagues (and that of the President). They can utilize the leverage 
the rules provide to gain concessions on matters of importance to 
them, things they could not otherwise obtain. In the real world, we 
call this blackmail—when one takes advantage of leverage he or she 
should not legitimately possess to force others to give up things the 
 
 119. U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem 
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Leg-
islatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, 
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, 
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in 
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress False”). 
 120. Marziani, Jonathan & Kasdan, supra note 111, at 11; see also Shaheen, supra note 95, 
at 17 (arguing that putting the burden on the minority to find forty-one votes to sustain a fili-
buster “would be the single most effective change we could make,” because “[t]he burden 
should be on those who want to delay action to show up and vote”).  
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blackmailer wants. Individual Senators, or minorities, like having the 
power to stop the legislative majority in its tracks, but this is no rea-
son for the country to let them keep it. It is a reason they will not 
give it up via a meaningful change in Senate rules, however, making it 
necessary that we take it away from them via constitutional change. 
One might think that the Senate majority would grow tired of 
having its business constantly held up, and eventually enact real re-
form (on the order of that suggested by Marziani, Backer, and 
Kasdan), even if it means giving up the precious prerogatives they en-
joy so much in their capacity as individual Senators. But recent histo-
ry tells us with near-absolute certainty that even when Senators are in 
a comfortable majority, many fear the time when they might again be 
in the minority and—if they weaken the filibuster—unable to stop 
the agenda of those on the other side.121 
The answer to this peculiar position, is that if you are afraid of 
the legislation the other side may pass, if and once they are in the ma-
jority . . . win elections! If you do not want the other side to be able 
to enact its agenda, win or retain control of the Senate. Or control 
the House, so that even if a bill you do not like passes the Senate, it 
can be defeated or changed in the House. Or, control the Presidency, 
with its precious veto power.122 As I will discuss, the Senate should 
have a deliberative process. But deliberation is not the same as ob-
struction, and it is the latter we are seeing. Even when they are in the 
majority, Senators are holding fast to the power to obstruct simply 
because they know they will want to be able to obstruct when the 
other side is on top. This tells us that the goal is not to deliberate. 
What drives Senators to preserve the filibuster system is, in other 
words, the furthest thing from a desire to maintain a deliberative pro-
 
 121. See Ezra Klein, Why Filibuster Reform Failed, and Where It Might Go Next, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/24 
/why-filibuster-reform-failed-and-where-it-might-go-next/ (“The reason there wasn’t root-
and-branch reform of the filibuster is that most Senate Democrats didn’t want root-and-branch 
reform of the filibuster. ‘Do not underestimate how much appreciation for the filibuster there is 
among senators who have been in the minority of this body and have been able to hold up legis-
lation,’ one Senate aide told me.”).  
 122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the 
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to 
that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their 
Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.”).  
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cess. The Senators want to rig the game so that deliberation doesn’t 
happen—not real deliberation. The Republican Senate Minority 
Leader had no interest in deliberation when he said, more than two 
years before the upcoming presidential election, that his primary goal 
was not to subject the President’s agenda to appropriate deliberation, 
but to see that the President of the opposing party would be “a one-
term President.”123 And the members of the Democratic majority, for 
their part, were no more interested in deliberation, given their un-
willingness to actually assume the power to govern as a majority by 
changing the filibuster rules because they were determined to pre-
serve the future, hypothetical right to block the agenda of a future, 
hypothetical GOP majority. 
Second, even if the Senate was willing and ready to adopt a re-
form package, there is not much meat to a proposal that simply says 
that a filibuster must be sustained by forty votes, instead of ended by 
sixty, and that the filibustering Senators must stay on the floor and 
actually filibuster. Granted, it would force those who want to keep 
the delay going to be available for the votes, and seek to ensure that 
only actual filibusters rather than their threat would bring about gen-
uine delay. Making the filibuster painful, or at least forcing the ob-
structionists to put some effort into it, has its benefits. 
But in a deeply polarized political climate, the benefits of ob-
struction are simply too great to make it plausible that Senators in 
the minority will stand down even if compelled to actually marshal 
their forces and mount real, live, old-fashioned filibusters. The tool 
must instead be forcibly taken away from them. 
Third, constitutional solutions are—Prohibition notwithstand-
ing124—permanent. Changes to Senate rules are more ephemeral.      
A constitutional requirement of the kind that I propose in the 29th 
Amendment, requiring that the Senate must take up certain bills    
and consider them by a simple majority vote, is not one that the   
Senate could, by itself, unilaterally alter125 when the political          
climate permitted. 
 
 123. See Michael A. Memoli, Mitch McConnell’s Remarks on 2012 Draw White House’s 
Ire, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/27/news/la-pn-obama-
mcconnell-20101027.  
 124. See U.S. CONST. amends. XVII, XIX (enacting and repealing Prohibition). 
 125. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Pro-
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For these reasons, reform must not be left to a Senate unwilling 
or unable to change its stripes, a Senate committed to a system that 
no longer works to produce the sort of deliberative consideration of 
the nation’s business that the Framers envisioned. It must be consti-
tutional change, and it should compel the Senate to consider legisla-
tion when there is a clear indication that enough time and attention 
has been given to the proposed bill to justify forcing the Senate to 
vote on a measure. As I indicated at the outset of this section, an ef-
fective mechanism to accomplish that goal can be found in many state 
constitutional provisions. 
Take, for example, Article X, Section 1 of the Iowa Constitution. 
It provides that a proposed constitutional amendment must first be 
agreed to by a majority of both houses of the General Assembly, and 
then by majority votes of both houses again after the next election, at 
which point the proposed amendment is referred to the voters for 
their approval.126 I will refer to this as the “two-Congress” or “two-
session” approach: the core idea is that before the state will change its 
foundational law, the proposal should go through a careful delibera-
tive process—one that includes consideration not just by a single ses-
sion of the state Legislature. Then moving on to a vote by the citi-
zens, but also including consideration by a subsequent session, one 
that meets after an intervening election. As Article X makes clear, the 
public that votes in that intervening election must receive published 
notice of the amendment that will be up for “final” legislative debate 
(or “second reading,” if you prefer).127 
 
ceedings . . . .”). 
 126. IOWA CONST. art. X, § 1 (“Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may 
be proposed in either house of the general assembly; and if the same shall be agreed to by a ma-
jority of the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment shall be 
entered on their journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the legislature 
to be chosen at the next general election, and shall be published, as provided by law, for three 
months previous to the time of making such choice; and if, in the general assembly so next cho-
sen as aforesaid, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to, by a majority of 
all the members elected to each house, then it shall be the duty of the general assembly to sub-
mit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people, in such manner, and at such time 
as the general assembly shall provide; and if the people shall approve and ratify such amend-
ment or amendments, by a majority of the electors qualified to vote for members of the general 
assembly, voting thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of the constitu-
tion of this state.”). 
 127. See id. (providing the proposed amendment shall be “referred to the legislature to be 
chosen at the next general election, and shall be published, as provided by law, for three months 
previous to the time of making such choice”). 
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Everything about the two-session approach screams that its goal 
is to provide ample opportunity for the state’s political system to fully 
assess the pros and cons and the impact of the proposed amendment. 
That is, to provide an opportunity for deliberation. The Iowa Gen-
eral Assembly gets two looks at the proposal, with an election in be-
tween the two evaluations. The voters also get two cracks at it. The 
first—somewhat indirect look—comes during the legislative election, 
during which the State Constitution requires they be given explicit 
notice of the initial passage of the proposed constitutional amend-
ment. This means that, if they choose, the voters can make opposi-
tion to the amendment a major election issue, turning out the incum-
bents who supported it and electing challengers who promise to 
oppose it. Or, conversely, the voters can opt to return those legisla-
tors to office to give the amendment the strongest possible chance of 
being given the required second thumbs-up before moving on to the 
referendum. Either way, the point is that the electorate can decide to 
make the General Assembly’s consideration of the proposed amend-
ment a key election issue. The voters’ second, more direct opportuni-
ty to deliberate about the proposal comes if and when it passes the 
second time through the General Assembly. Even after running that 
gauntlet through both Houses, receiving majority passage in each one 
twice, the proposal must still win a referendum at the polls. 
This process can be seen as an alternative to the high barriers that 
Article V of the federal Constitution erects for passing an amend-
ment. Under the typical process, an amendment must be approved by 
two-thirds majorities of both Houses and then ratified by three-
fourths of the States.128 Since the state-by-state ratification hurdle is 
not readily transferable to the states, the two-session approach is one 
way to replicate the general principle that it should be relatively diffi-
cult to effect constitutional change, and that such change should take 
place only after careful consideration. 
Thus, it is not surprising that this device is not limited to Iowa. 
To the contrary, it is utilized in various forms in seventeen states. 
Twelve of these states require passage in two sessions of their legisla-
tures as a requirement.129 Most, but not all of these states, then re-
 
 128. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 129. See DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (passage by 2/3 majority in both Houses in consecu-
tive sessions; no ballot required by citizenry); IND. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (passage by majority of 
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quire the voters of the state to approve the amendment in a subse-
quent referendum. Four other states (Connecticut, Hawaii, New Jer-
sey, and Pennsylvania) make the two-session process an alternative. If 
the proposed amendment passes by a super-majority in both Houses, 
it need pass in only one session before going to the voters. But if the 
proposal can muster only a simple majority in either House, then it 
must pass again in a second session.130 
The two-session solution can be adapted to replace the filibuster, 
avoiding the obstructionism that has devastated Congress’ ability to 
do the people’s business while reinforcing the Senate’s role as a de-
liberative body. When a bill passes the House during one Congress, 
the Senate has a full range of options as it deliberates over the merits 
of the proposal. For example, if convinced a bill makes little sense, 
the Senate can bottle up the bill in committee and never take it up. 
 
both Houses in consecutive sessions, then sent to voters for approval); MASS. CONST. art. 
XLVIII, c. IV, §§ 4–5 (amendment proposal introduced by member of legislature must be ap-
proved by majority of both Houses in consecutive sessions, then by voters in ballot referen-
dum); NEV. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (passage by majority of both Houses in consecutive sessions, 
then sent to voters for approval, with provisions for handling multiple proposals on same sub-
ject that may go before voters at the same time); N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (passage by a ma-
jority of both Houses in consecutive sessions, then sent to voters for approval); PA. CONST. art. 
XI, § 1 (passage by a simple majority in both Houses in consecutive sessions, then sent to voters 
for approval, with exception allowing for passage in one session by 2/3 majority of both Houses, 
if legislature declares a major emergency which threatens the Commonwealth, with approval of 
voters still required); S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (passage by 2/3 majority of both Houses, which 
sends proposed amendment to the voters; if it passes by majority, it returns to Legislature in 
next session where it must pass by simple majority of both Houses); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3 
(passage by a simple majority of both Houses in the first session, and then by a 2/3 majority of 
both Houses in the next session; then sent to the voters for passage by referendum); VT. 
CONST. ch. II, § 72 (passage by a 2/3 majority of the Senate and simple majority of the House 
in the first session, then by simple majority of both Houses in the second session; then sent to 
the voters for passage by referendum); VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (passage by simple majority in 
both Houses in consecutive sessions, then sent to voters for passage by referendum); WIS. 
CONST. art. XII, § 1 (passage by simple majority in both Houses in consecutive sessions, then 
sent to voters for passage by referendum). 
 130. See CONN. CONST. art. XII (passage can occur in one session if both Houses do so 
by 75% majority; otherwise, amendment must be passed by simple majority of both Houses in 
consecutive sessions and then sent to voters for passage by referendum); HAW. CONST. art. 
XVII, § 3 (passage can occur in one session if both Houses do so by 2/3 majority; otherwise, 
amendment must be passed by simple majority of both Houses in consecutive sessions and then 
sent to voters for passage by referendum); N.J. CONST. art. IX, ¶ 1 (passage can occur in one 
session if both Houses do so by 60% majority; otherwise, amendment must be passed by simple 
majority of both Houses in consecutive sessions and then sent to voters for passage by referen-
dum); PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (normally requires passage in consecutive sessions by simple ma-
jority of both Houses, but Legislature can declare an emergency which threatens the Com-
monwealth and pass an amendment by 2/3 majority of both Houses in a single session and send 
proposal to voters for passage in a referendum). 
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The Senate can also allow the bill to come to the floor for debate, 
with amendments offered—but perhaps rejecting it on the basis that 
it is ill-advised or that more consideration is needed (both in       
Congress and across the country). The bill might pass the Senate,   
but in amended form, and the two versions might not be               
reconciled for final passage and ultimately sent on to the President 
for his or her consideration. 
A Senate minority could also, under its rules and traditions, fili-
buster the bill, requiring sixty Senators to vote to end debate.131 A 
proposal that passes overwhelmingly in the House, and enjoys bipar-
tisan support of a majority of Senators, might not be able to clear the 
legislative process because of the ability of the minority to clog the 
process and prevent a vote from ever taking place on the Senate floor. 
Some think that this limited use of the filibuster should not be 
changed, based on the notion that it is the Senate’s job to slow down 
the pace of the nation’s legislative work. There are times when the 
nation benefits from having the passions behind an idea cool-off, al-
lowing longer-term values to reassert themselves in the debate. This 
allows time for discussion of additional proposals that might not have 
appeared upon initial consideration.132 What supporters of a bill see 
as “obstructive” use of the Senate’s rules can just as readily be con-
strued as fulfillment of the Senate’s core role. It is fair to give the 
benefit of the doubt to a filibuster that commands the loyal support 
of more than forty Senators (and thus cannot be broken by a success-
ful cloture motion)—for a time. 
That time should not be unlimited. At some point in a delibera-
tive process, a democratically self-governing people have the right to 
say that we have deliberated enough. We have given the minority 
sufficient time to convince us that the proposed legislation is a mis-
take. We are entitled to respond that we remain unconvinced on the 
 
 131. See Rule XXII, Precedence of Motions, Rules of the S., http://www.rules.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXII (establishing that a motion raising the question, “Is it the sense 
of the Senate that the debate shall be brought to a close?” must receive the affirmative vote of 
three-fifths of Senators “duly chosen and sworn”.). 
 132. This notion of the need to have a Senate that can “cool” the passions of the House is 
at the heart of the claimed conversation between George Washington (defending the Senate) 
and Thomas Jefferson (the skeptic). See Dan T. Coenen, The Filibuster and the Framing: Why 
the Cloture Rule Is Unconstitutional and What to Do About It, 55 B.C. L. REV. 39, 82–83 
(2014) (relating Washington’s portrayal of “the Senate as a saucer into which the heated actions 
of the House are wisely poured to cool.”). 
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merits of their argument. With the revised filibuster, the minority 
will have had the entirety of one Congress to utilize the delay the fil-
ibuster gives them to make their case against the bill. If in the inter-
vening election, the American people return to office a House major-
ity still committed to the bill they passed in the prior Congress, and 
the bill then passes again, the minority should not be able to resort to 
delaying tactics. 
To argue against this is to assert that Senate opponents of a bill, 
in the minority, should be able to use the filibuster to prevent a vote 
on it in perpetuity. That claim transforms the filibuster from a tool to 
promote deliberation into one suited only for obstruction. A 2010 
Senate Rules Committee Hearing looking at filibuster reform pro-
posals is instructive on this point. Several Senators spoke in defense 
of the filibuster, and almost every one of them did so by pointing to 
the importance of allowing for full, measured consideration of major 
bills of critical national importance.133 If the filibuster’s predominant 
defense includes ensuring deliberate consideration of legislation, that 
defense does not support a filibuster which actually permits endless 
obstruction. This dissonance between the use of the filibuster, and 
the defenses presented for it, strips away the benefit of the doubt I 
granted in the first place in allowing for the filibuster to continue to 
play a role in blocking votes on legislation for the duration of an en-
tire Congress. Once our two-session (or two-Congress) requirement 
has been cleared, those blocking action in the Senate should no   
longer operate with the benefit of the doubt. Seventeen states         
already employ this requirement during deliberations concerning 
constitutional amendments. 
Under the proposed 29th Amendment, the House would have the 
option of repassing any bill that it had passed in the prior Congress 
 
 133. See Examining the Filibuster, supra note 115, at 6-7 (“In sum, the founders purpose-
fully crafted the Senate to be a deliberate, thoughtful body. A supermajority requirement to cut 
off the right to debate ensures that wise purpose. Eliminating it is a bad idea.”) (opening state-
ment of Senator McConnell); at 12 (“The filibuster is the essence of the Senate. It is not a tool 
of obstructionism or dysfunction. It is meant to foster greater consultation, consensus and co-
operation between the parties. It is a means for the minority to make its voice heard and to con-
tribute to debate and amend legislation before the Senate.”) (opening statement of Senator 
Roberts); at 14 (“[Filibuster reform would remove] legislative hurdles that are the reason this 
body is regarded as a guardian of checks and balances, and separation of powers”; decrying 
“[a]ny reform effort which attempts to weaken the protections of minority rights and further 
enable fast-tracked legislating.”) (opening statement of Senator Chambliss). 
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which failed to receive a vote in the Senate. This would compel the 
Senate to act on the bill within sixty days, assuming at least one 
member of the Senate moves to bring the bill to the floor. It would 
not require the Senate to pass the bill. Repassage by the House would 
simply overcome the traditional prerogative of a minority of the Sen-
ate to prevent a Senate majority from taking up the bill. A majority of 
the Senate could still defeat the bill if it so chose on a simple vote on 
the Senate floor. 
The Amendment would also ensure that a single Senator could 
not place a “hold” on the bill with the implicit threat that a filibuster 
could follow, a threat that has rendered Majority Leaders in recent 
years typically unable to simply ignore such hold requests.134 Under 
the 29th Amendment, a single Senator’s motion to take up an exempt 
bill would constitutionally require the Senate to do so within sixty 
days, trumping any hold request. In effect, the tables would              
be turned; instead of a single Senator being able to hold up legisla-
tion, a single Senator would be able to force legislation to the floor 
for a vote. 
The most important impact of the 29th Amendment, in my view, 
would be to change the leverage of each side of the filibuster debate 
during the first Congress during which a particular bill passes the 
House. Under the existing rules, a determined and cohesive minority 
in the Senate can delay long enough to simply kill off a bill for the 
entirety of a Congress. After all, when a Congress adjourns at the end 
of its second session, legislation dies if it has not passed both House 
and Senate. There is little incentive for the Senate minority to com-
promise on bills it opposes, because in a polarized political climate 
Senators in the minority gain more by successfully opposing the 
agenda of the majority party than by reaching an accommodation in 
the middle. 
But under the 29th Amendment, Senators in the minority would 
have far less to gain from delay. Killing the bill in the 115th Congress 
does not actually kill the bill—it may well come back in the 116th 
Congress, passed by the House again, this time turbo-charged with a 
newly-acquired exemption from the filibuster. Nevertheless, during 
 
 134. See supra pp. 135-137 (discussing impact of “holds” by which even a single Senator 
can delay the Senate’s business inordinately). 
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the 115th Congress, the filibuster would remain an effective bargain-
ing chip, since the bill’s supporters would want to avoid the delay—
particularly in the case of legislation being considered early in one 
Congress. The next Congress will not be elected for close to two 
years, and the bill’s supporters would often be anxious to make con-
cessions to avoid that delay. They could also not be sure, or even 
confident, that they will continue to hold the House and thus be able 
to pass the bill again at all in the next Congress. 
So, the bill’s supporters would want to compromise with those 
who filibuster or threaten to do so during the first Congress, because 
they would be uncertain of their position in the next Congress. And 
the filibusterers would also want to compromise, because they too 
would be uncertain of their position. If they do not change the com-
position of Congress in the intervening election, and the bill passes 
the House again, the filibuster will be lost, filibusterers’ leverage will 
be gone, and they will no longer be able to delay a bill they oppose. 
Consequently, filibusterers would have to kill the bill or at least force 
changes in it. When both sides have maximum incentive to compro-
mise, the legislative process can work. In a nutshell, the uncertainty 
over the conditions that will govern the rules in the subsequent Con-
gress would make both the majority and the minority more willing to 
deal under the certain conditions they face in the current Congress. 
Senator Lamar Alexander’s candid comments at a 2010 Commit-
tee hearing on filibuster reform about the real political calculation 
surrounding the use of the filibuster demonstrate the importance of 
tailoring reform to the political realities of legislative bargaining. Al-
exander’s questioning of former Senate staff member Stanley Bach, 
an expert on Senate procedure and history, produced this exchange: 
Senator ALEXANDER. Mr. Bach, unless the majority believes the 
minority is willing to kill a bill, how can it persuade the majority to 
take it seriously in changing the bill? When you said a filibuster 
might be all right if you are only going to do it to improve the bill 
but the way you get the attention of the majority is to say, if you do 
not, we will kill it. 
Mr. BACH. This is the issue that Senator Bennett raised earlier, 
what is the minority’s true intention, to kill or to compromise. 
Senator ALEXANDER. How are you going to determine that? 
That is just a matter of human nature. 
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Mr. BACH. No one on the outside can determine that. That is a 
question that only Senators can determine in looking at what they 
and their colleagues are doing. 
Senator ALEXANDER. But is it not a fairly simple rule of human 
nature that if you do not think I am serious you are not going to pay 
any attention to me. 
Mr. BACH. Yes, it is. 
Senator ALEXANDER. We all know that. Look at the financial re-
form bill debate right now. Forty-one Republicans have signed a 
letter saying, you know, we might filibuster this if you do not let us 
have some participation in making it a better bill. If the Democrats 
think there is no chance to we will do that— the only reason we 
think we are getting a chance at some participation is they think we 
might actually do that.135 
Legislatures work on the basis of leverage, bargaining, and com-
promise. Senator Alexander’s point in his discussion with Bach was 
that the minority has to be able to threaten (and convince the majori-
ty it is serious and will follow through) to induce the majority to 
compromise over the bill, and thus achieve a bipartisan consensus to 
pass it. If the majority either does not need their votes (because the 
filibuster has been eliminated) or does not believe they can or will 
follow through on the threat, then the minority has no power, and 
the majority can do whatever it wants, as quickly as it wants. 
One need not accept Senator Alexander’s implied narrative that 
constant Republican filibusters during the Obama Administration 
were simply an attempt to create a strong bargaining position. And 
that Republicans were, all along, willing to meaningfully compromise 
on virtually all the major legislation they opposed (from health care 
reform to Dodd-Frank to the stimulus package). Alexander’s claim is 
less than credible in light of the GOP’s unwillingness to provide 
votes for compromise proposals on these issues,136 and the clear 
 
 135. Examining the Filibuster, supra note 115, at 32 (questioning of witness Stanley I. 
Bach by Sen. Lamar Alexander).  
 136. See Norm Ornstein, The Real Story of Obamacare’s Birth, THE ATLANTIC (July 6, 
2015),https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/the-real-story-of-obamacares-
birth/397742/. Ornstein notes that the Obama Administration spent months while the bill was 
pending in the Senate awaiting the outcome of negotiations between Finance Committee 
Chairman Max Baucus and several Republicans—especially ranking member Charles Grassley 
of Iowa—which ultimately proved fruitless despite Baucus’ attempts to craft a compromise 
MARCOSSON, FOR PUBLICIATION, 4.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2019  5:28 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 33 
276 
statements of Senator McConnell and other GOP Senators that their 
strategy was one of partisan opposition from the outset.137 But the 
dysfunction of recent practice does not fatally undermine—indeed, it 
supports—the point that if we are to restore the Senate to a reasona-
ble semblance of functionality, we need to create a system in which 
both sides are operating within a structure that gives them powerful 
incentives to actually compromise. 
Of course, the two-Congress approach is not a solution to the 
misuse of the filibuster in all political seasons. For instance, it would 
be of least value in cases where the House is likely to pass bills that 
the Senate majority does not support. From 2011-2015, for example, 
the House was held by a Republican majority implacably opposed to 
the agenda of the Obama Administration, while Democrats held the 
majority in the Senate. While the GOP minority in the Senate used 
the filibuster repeatedly to block Democratic initiatives, it was gener-
ally in tandem with, not in opposition to, the work of the House ma-
jority. In a situation like this, the 29th Amendment’s most likely ben-
efit would be to allow the party controlling the House to force floor 
votes in the Senate on bills that passed the House in both the 112th 
 
around principles that had been part of proposals once championed by Republicans. These dis-
cussions foundered because “Republican Leader Mitch McConnell had warned both Grassley 
and Enzi that their futures in the Senate would be much dimmer if they moved toward a deal 
with the Democrats that would produce legislation to be signed by Barack Obama. They both 
listened to their leader.” Id.  
 137. See Sam Stein, Robert Draper Book: GOP’s Anti-Obama Campaign Started Night 
of Inauguration, THE HUFFINGTON POST (April 25, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2012/04/25/robert-draper-anti-obama-campaign_n_1452899.html (discussing story told in 
Robert Draper’s book, “Do Not Ask What Good We Do: Inside the U.S. House of Represent-
atives,” showing, “As President Barack Obama was celebrating his inauguration at various balls, 
top Republican lawmakers and strategists were conjuring up ways to submarine his presidency 
at a private dinner in Washington.”); Michael A. Memoli, Mitch McConnell’s Remarks on 2012 
Draw White House Ire, THE L.A.TIMES, (Oct. 27, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct 
/27/news/la-pn-obama-mcconnell-20101027 (quoting Sen. Mitch McConnell (R., Ky), that, 
“[T]he single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term 
president.”). Senator McConnell’s determination to seek partisan gain by opposing anything 
and everything proposed by President Obama manifested itself even before Obama took office. 
See Greg Sargent, Biden: McConnell Decided to Deny Us Cooperation Before We Took Of-
fice, WASHINGTON POST, August (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs 
/plum-line/post/biden-mcconnell-decided-to-withhold-all-cooperation-even-before-we-took-
office/2012/08/10/64e9a138-e302-11e1-98e7-89d659f9c106_blog.html (discussing book “The 
New Deal” by Michael Grunwald, in which Vice President Biden relates that seven GOP Sena-
tors told him, “Joe, I’m not going to be able to help you on anything,” because “McConnell had 
demanded unified resistance,” which McConnell saw as the Republicans’ “ticket to coming 
back.”). 
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Congress (2011-2013) and the 113th Congress (2013-2015) and were 
kept from the floor not by filibusters but by adverse committee action 
and the scheduling authority of the Majority Leader. 
But even this limited impact is worthwhile. This use of the 29th 
Amendment adds accountability by forcing Senators to take a stand 
on the record, with an official vote on the bill.138 Presumably, given 
the wide policy differences between the Senate and the House, these 
votes would not actually result in many (if any) House bills passing, 
but even this might not be certain. When the Senate and House are 
in opposite partisan camps, the leadership of the House has little if 
any incentive to moderate the content of the bills that pass the 
House, since such outreach in the direction of compromise does not 
appeal to the base of the party and then has no pay-off in improving 
the chances of the bill making it through the Senate. 
The 29th Amendment could change the political calculus. On at 
least some issues, the House leadership could write bills in such a way 
that could seek to tempt cross-over votes in the Senate (with the side-
effect that it might even promote bipartisanship in the House as well, 
even if this was not the immediate goal). Even if the Senate leader-
ship could block a vote (using a filibuster or other means) during the 
first Congress, those tools would be unavailable in the second Con-
gress—but only if the bills are identical (since the Amendment re-
quires that the bill passed in the second Congress be the same as that 
passed in the first to be entitled to the filibuster exemption). Thus, 
moderation would be encouraged from the time bills are drafted, de-
bated, and passed in the House. 
Consider the Republicans’ repeated efforts after they took con-
trol of the House in the 2010 election to repeal President Obama’s 
 
 138. Sparing vulnerable incumbents from having to cast “tough votes” that can be used 
against them by challengers is a time-honored tradition in Washington. See Charlie Cook, 
Avoiding Tough Votes: The Wimp Factor in Congress, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://news.yahoo.com/avoiding-tough-votes-wimp-factor-congress-200507060—politics.html 
(“For the past two decades, one of the least understood but most important unwritten job re-
quirements for congressional leaders has been to protect their members from difficult and po-
tentially politically costly votes, either in committee or on the floor. Some of the most pressing 
policy issues of the day are never voted on or are so diluted that one would be hard-pressed to 
use voting records to nail down how any member feels about anything of real consequence.”). I 
deem it a virtue of this proposal that it would lessen the ability of members of Congress to 
avoid votes in which they take positions for which they can be held accountable.  
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signature first-term accomplishment, the Affordable Care Act.139 
None of those bills had any chance to be enacted while Democrats 
held the Senate and with President Obama in office wielding the veto 
pen if it became necessary. But in a world with the 29th Amendment, 
there would have been substantial incentive sometime during the 
112th Congress for House Republicans to pass a bill which made real 
inroads into the Act. While short of outright repeal, the Bill would 
propose health care reform more in line with Republican ideas. Such 
a bill would have put enormous pressure on Democrats and the 
White House to accept revisions to the law. They would have been 
faced with the choice to either negotiate around the Republican 
bill—and thus achieve a more bipartisan approach and broader na-
tional consensus on a key issue—or risk blocking it. There is no 
doubt they could have chosen the latter course (since during the 
112th Congress, Senate Democrats retained the full authority to re-
fuse to take up a bill passed by the House). But blocking the House-
passed bill, rather than trying to reach a compromise during that 
Congress, would mean gambling that the Senate would be able to ac-
tually defeat it in the next, 113th Congress. Because if the bill passed 
the House the second time around, blocking it would not be an op-
tion. The House bill would be entitled to a vote on the floor of the 
Senate. All the incentives, on both sides, would be shifted (perhaps 
not decisively, but at least significantly) towards compromise and ne-
gotiation. Similar stories could be told on environmental regulation 
and immigration reform, as well as other issues. 
Nevertheless, situations in which control of Congress is split be-
tween the parties (and especially in which the parties are as polarized 
as they have become in recent years) are not the ones in which the 
29th Amendment would have its greatest impact. The more critical 
times for its use would be when one party controls the House and 
Senate, with a clear mandate from the American people to advance an 
agenda, and that agenda is stymied by a minority in the Senate which 
uses the filibuster to prevent its key pieces from reaching the Senate 
floor. This cynical strategy then forms the foundation of a political 
 
 139. See Dierdre Walsh, House Passes 50th Bill to Undo Obamacare, CNN (Mar. 5, 
2014), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/03/05/house-passes-50th-bill-to-undo-obama 
care/.  
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campaign against the majority, accusing them of failing to solve the 
nation’s problems despite their majority status in Congress. 
If majority status is going to bring with it political accountability, 
it should also be accompanied by genuine authority. For example,    
the Republican Party enjoyed majority control of both the House and 
Senate during the time between the 104th and 106th Congressional 
sessions. That control should have allowed Republicans to enact their 
agenda, at least through Congress. Of course, this would have        
required the Republicans to negotiate with then Democratic Presi-
dent, Bill Clinton. And given President Clinton’s 1996 re-election 
victory, the Republicans would have been tempered in their ability to 
claim a genuine and complete mandate. Had the 29th Amendment 
been in effect, any bills the House enacted in the 104th Congress 
(from 1995-1997) which could not receive a Senate vote due to 
Democratic filibusters140 (the Democrats held forty-eight seats) 
would have been guaranteed a Senate vote upon repassage in the 
105th (from 1997-1999). 
I can hear my Democratic friends wailing now: “You mean this 
would have meant the passage of the Contract With America? Count 
me out!” First of all, that’s not necessarily the case, unless we are as-
suming that someone would have stolen President Clinton’s veto 
pen. But second, we either believe in the idea that democratic institu-
tions should be free to eventually reach decisions and take action, or 
we do not. By all means, decisions and action should come only after 
due deliberation, but in my view this condition is satisfied by a system 
in which a bill must be passed by the House in consecutive Congress-
es. A bill that reaches that stage under the proposed 29th Amendment 
would be subject during the first Congress to the full range of Sena-
torial delaying tactics available under the traditional rules and prac-
tices allowed in the current system, and gets a green light to the Sen-
ate floor only in the second Congress. We cannot accept the idea that 
elections matter only when we like the election returns. Just as the 
29th Amendment would have made for easier sledding in the Senate 
 
 140. See SARAH BINDER, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?: FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE 183–84 (1997) (“Throughout the 104th Congress, Democrats used filibusters 
and threatened filibusters to block action on the Republican program, including elements of the 
House Republicans’ Contract With America.”). 
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for the pet projects of the Gingrich Revolution in the 90s, so too 
would it have made life easier for the Obama agenda a decade later. 
President Obama was swept into office with a strong Democratic 
majority in Congress, with the 111th Congress coming into power 
with an almost filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and an equally 
impressive working majority of 256-178 in the House. Indeed, for a 
brief time, the Democrats actually held sixty Senate seats. This 
amount was nominally sufficient to invoke cloture and break any 
GOP filibuster, but could only work if Democrats remained fully 
united. This control lasted from the moment that Senator Al Franken 
was sworn in on July 7, 2009 (after his disputed election was finally 
settled)141 until January 2010, when Senator Scott Brown won a spe-
cial election to fill the Massachusetts seat that had been left vacant by 
the death of Senator Edward Kennedy.142 Nevertheless, despite this 
impressive level of control, Democrats still faced unprecedented una-
nimity from their Republican opponents in the Senate, who followed 
a strategy formulated by Minority Leader Mitch McConnell to find 
strength in complete cohesiveness in opposition to the Democratic 
agenda.143 This paid off when they were able to repeatedly block Sen-
ate votes using their forty-one votes after Senator Brown’s election to 
prevent important legislation embodying Democratic priorities from 
coming to the floor.144 
Under a scenario in which the 29th Amendment had been in 
place, the Democrats would have been able to frame the 2010 elec-
 
 141. See Manu Raju, Senator Franken Takes Oath of Office, POLITICO (July 8, 2009), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/24637.html.  
 142. See Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html.  
 143. See Sargent, supra note 137 (discussing claim made by Vice-President Biden that 
“seven members of the opposition confided to him that their party had adopted a comprehen-
sive strategy to oppose literally everything the new President did — with the explicit purpose of 
denying him any successes of any kind for their own political purposes — even before he took 
office.”). 
 144. See ProgressMass, New Study: ProgressMass Analysis of Scott Brown’s Voting Rec-
ord Reveals Highly Partisan Record, Overwhelming Support for Republican Obstruction in 
U.S. Senate (May 7, 2012), (detailing results of http://www.progressmass.org/press/new-study-
progressmass-analysis-of-scott-browns-voting-record-reveals-highly-partisan-record-
overwhe.html), (detailing results of study of Sen. Brown’s voting record showing he had sup-
ported forty of fifty-three GOP filibusters on bills that had the support of more than fifty Sena-
tors, including thirty of thirty-two prior to the entry of his most serious – and ultimately suc-
cessful – challenger, Elizabeth Warren, into the race). Almost all of the bills that Sen. Brown 
helped the Republicans stop ultimately never received an up-or-down vote in the Senate. 
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tions around a series of measures that had passed the House in the 
111th Congress, but which Republicans effectively kept from the 
Senate floor. These measures included bills that were designed to 
further the Administration’s efforts to jumpstart the economy. The 
Democrats could have asked the voters to return them with a re-
newed majority in the 112th Congress so they could repass those 
measures in the House and thus vest them with an exemption from 
the filibuster in the Senate. 
Would this argument have been successful in changing the narra-
tive of the 2010 elections, in which Democrats were overwhelmed 
and lost the House and six seats in the Senate (as well as nearly losing 
that majority as well)? Perhaps not. But it would have given voters 
some basis to believe that a Democratic Congress working with       
the Obama Administration could accomplish more from 2010-2012 
than it had in the prior two years, and that it could have actually 
overcome Republican-induced gridlock rather than simply putting 
the country through two more years of it. In short, voters should be 
able to hear the message that gridlock is not a permanent feature of 
our political system. 
Candidates running for office in democratic legislatures should 
be able to tell voters that if they are given the responsibility of hold-
ing the majority, actual power will come with that responsibility. The 
proposed 29th Amendment would give a party that holds the majority 
the ability to do that, within reason. The filibuster could slow them 
down for the duration of one Congress, respecting the Framers’ wis-
dom in favoring measured deliberation over important issues. The 
minority can elect either to bargain towards compromise, or force a 
majority seeking to enact important changes to go to the voters with 
a specific program of the legislation they would enact if freed from 
the constraints of the filibuster. 
The two-Congress proposal bears some similarities to a filibuster 
reform approach advanced in 2011 by law professor Gerard Maglioc-
ca of the University of Indiana-Indianapolis.145 Professor Magliocca’s 
proposal borrowed from the House of Lords’ power to exercise         
a “suspensory veto” over legislation passed by the House of       
 
 145. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 N.W. U.L. REV. 303 
(2011). 
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Commons, which in effect holds up such laws for one year. The his-
tory demonstrates how the second look authority that was once held 
by the House of Lords, and which evolved into the suspensory veto, 
is in some ways consistent with my two-Congress proposal to limit 
the filibuster: 
They could also reject bills and require the Commons to pass them 
again to test the elected majority’s resolve. And on matters of grave 
concern, a steadfast rejection would force a general election that 
gave voters a chance to decide if a proposal by the Commons de-
served support. A norm evolved that if the Commons approved the 
controversial bill again after the election, then the Lords would 
cease their resistance. In effect, the House of Lords enforced a 
“second-look” doctrine that was intended to assess preference in-
tensity but conceded the power of the majority to rule in the end.146 
Of course, the filibuster that prevents consideration of a House-
passed bill does not “reject” it in the same way the House of Lords’ 
exercise of the “second-look” doctrine did. However, both turn        
on the notion of allowing the voters to either return the majority      
to power to once again pass the contested bill, this time with a 
smoother path to passage, or to decide that the upper chamber had 
the better of the argument in slowing down the process to allow for 
more deliberation. 
Ultimately, however, the second-look doctrine foundered in Eng-
land because “the veto of the House of Lords was seen more and 
more as a substantive impediment,”147 and a partisan tool of Con-
servatives when they were in opposition to a Labor Government.148 
The Parliament Act of 1911 reformed the process and reduced the 
power of the House of Lords. That reform most closely parallels 
what I believe the two-Congress 29th Amendment would achieve in 
providing that “most bills passed by three consecutive sessions of the 
Commons would become law without the approval of the Lords.”149 
The difference is that our concern is not with sidestepping the ap-
proval of the Senate, but with creating a procedure by which it can be 
obtained by a simple majority vote. The approval of the House of 
 
 146. Id. at 321 (references omitted; emphasis added). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 321-22, nn.81–85. 
 149. Id. at 322. 
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Representatives in the second look would not be sufficient to allow 
the bill to pass Congress, but it would end the ability of the upper 
chamber to force additional and unusual delay. 
Professor Magliocca’s proposal—which would put a time limit of 
one year on the filibuster150—seems less clearly inspired by the Eng-
lish Parliamentary history he relates. He argues that his idea is similar 
in that England has effectively given “a temporary veto [to] the 
House of Lords designed to further discussion while restricting mi-
nority obstruction,” and this “would also be the best reform for clo-
ture.”151 In most circumstances, there is nothing in his approach that 
actually requires a second look or repassage by the House of Repre-
sentatives to give a bill any special treatment or change its treatment 
in the legislative process, as happens under the Parliament Act of 
1911, and under my proposed 29th Amendment.152 
With inspiration in both state constitutional provisions requiring 
consideration of amendments in two sessions of the state legislature, 
and the relationship between the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons, each of which reflect the importance of a careful, deliber-
ative legislative process, I am confident that my proposal meets the 
objection of self-described filibuster defender Robert Dove, who in 
his written testimony before Congress in 2010 posed the question 
“whether the solution to addressing . . . abuse of the filibuster is by 
tearing down 200 years of Senate history and tradition and throwing 
the protections of the minority and the underlying principles of 
checks and balances and separation of powers away in the process.”153 
By protecting the traditional and historical role of the minority in the 
Senate’s balance of power, the proposed 29th Amendment respects 
 
 150. Id. at 305. 
 151. Id. at 323. 
 152. A second look would only rarely be required in the House of Representatives. It 
would occur only when the bill went over to the Senate so late in the Congress that Professor 
Magliocca’s one-year filibuster would be sufficient to run out the clock and kill the bill. In that 
instance, the “second look” would occur in the next Congress, and, he acknowledges, it would 
start the one-year clock running all over again. Id. at 321. Thus, repassage by the House in suc-
cessive Congresses would be of no moment in the legislative process under his proposal. Under 
the 32nd Amendment I have advanced here, it would be the critical step in breaking the power 
of the filibuster. 
 153. Examining the Filibuster, supra note 115, at 65 (written testimony of Robert B. 
Dove). 
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the concerns Dove raises, while calibrating them for the 21st century 
political realities in which the Senate operates. 
We need a new balance between the power to get things done in 
Congress and the tools given to the minority to restrain the majority. 
I have not joined the chorus of those who would simply eliminate the 
filibuster, because that goes too far towards pure unrestrained majori-
tarian authority. Our constitutional framework’s protection for indi-
vidual154 and minority155 rights provides too much evidence that we 
must take care to keep the majority in reasonable check. Though the 
balance needs to be modified to take account of the changed circum-
stances in which we find ourselves, we must not lose sight of the need 
to carefully maintain protections for the interests of the minority in 
our legislative process as well. By preserving the filibuster in modified 
form, the 29th Amendment ensures that the Senate minority retains 
bargaining leverage, and critically that it still has the chance to go 
back to the country to make principled arguments in defense of the 
positions it has taken and win the day—if it can. It is the democratic 
solution to the mess Washington has made for our democracy. 
Of course, this brings us back to the very same problem we en-
countered156 when it came to the 28th Amendment. If we have to 
count on the very institutions that create obstruction in the first place 
to enact reforms, the way forward seems difficult at best, impassable 
at worst. Since the Senate and its members seem determined to cling 
to the filibuster and the prerogatives it brings, the chances are remote 
that they would approve and send on to the states for ratification a 
constitutional amendment to substantially limit the filibuster—by a 
two-thirds vote, no less. 
 
 154. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
Just in this partial text of one amendment, the Constitution strips the majority of the power to 
compel criminal defendants to provide the testimony that the State might otherwise use to con-
vict them, to use whatever process the majority might wish along the road to take away an indi-
vidual’s life, liberty, or property, and to take away an individual’s property without compensat-
ing him or her. 
 155. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added). 
 156. See supra pp. 118-20 (discussing political obstacles to getting the House to agree to 
send a constitutional solution to partisan gerrymandering to the states). 
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If there is hope on this score, it can be found in the way the Sen-
ate did away with the filibuster for presidential nominations, one step 
at a time. First, in 2013, the Senate was in Democratic hands, and the 
majority tired of the frequent use by the Republican minority to 
block confirmation of executive branch and judicial nominees sub-
mitted by President Obama. This led to the dramatically named “nu-
clear option,” triggered in November of that year by Majority Leader 
Harry Reid, to eliminate the use of the filibuster for all presidential 
nominations except the Supreme Court.157 However, this was a lim-
ited first step, because the move did “not apply to Supreme Court 
nominations or to legislation.”158 
The next step was not long in coming. When Democrats were 
united in their opposition to the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the 
Supreme Court (after Republicans had refused to even hold hearings 
for President Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland, for the same seat 
after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia),159 the Senate’s Republican 
majority extended the relatively new rule barring filibusters of nomi-
nations to the last redoubt: Supreme Court nominations.160 
Now that the filibuster no longer operates as a means for the mi-
nority to block judicial nominations, there has been some speculation 
that the end of the legislative filibuster will not be far behind.161 Of 
course, speculation is just that: speculation. There has been no move 
to actually enact even filibuster reform when it comes to legislation, 
much less abolition. It may indeed be telling that even in a Senate 
 
 157. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear” Option; Eliminate Most Filibus-
ters on Nominees, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-
precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html?noredirect 
=on&utm_term=.c9e96a0de7ac. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Harper Neidig, No Hearing for Obama’s Supreme Court Nominee, McConnell 
Says, THE HILL (Mar. 16, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/273230-
mcconnell-no-hearing-for-garland. 
 160. See Russell Berman, Republicans Abandon the Filibuster to Save Neil Gorsuch, THE 
ATLANTIC, (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/republicans 
-nuke-the-filibuster-to-save-neil-gorsuch/522156/ (noting that Democrats had mustered forty-
four votes to deny Gorsuch confirmation, requiring elimination of the filibuster to lower the 
number required for confirmation from sixty to fifty-one). 
       161.    Id. (Noting that “some lawmakers were skeptical” of Sen. McConnell’s assurance 
that “he would not seek to revoke the 60-vote threshold for legislation,” and were predicting its 
ultimate demise). 
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where the filibuster, as it applies to nominations, has been first sub-
stantially undercut, and then completely eliminated (all since 2013), 
no parallel move has occurred when it comes to the legislative filibus-
ter. It is very much a hardy creature, and its utility in stopping legis-
lation remains powerful. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Intractable problems invite the conclusion that they cannot be 
solved. While I stop just short of that pessimistic verdict, the depth of 
the dysfunction in both the House and Senate strongly suggest both 
that the problem requires powerful and creative solutions, and a way 
to get around the maddening problem that these bodies themselves 
have to be involved in enacting these solutions. The sobering reality 
is that while we can envision ways to fix Congress, as I have attempt-
ed to do here, doing so seems a distant goal. 
 
